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1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that CA2 failed to accord the 
=== 
to factual findings by the state 'T'C, that the rA ------ ----------~'-~~~---------------have dismissed petr's habeas petn on the ground that the 
issue it raises was raised (and rejected) in a previous habeas 
petn, and that the CA erred in holding for resp on the basis of 
United States v. Henry, 447 u.s. 264 (1980). 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: In 1972, after being ar-
rested and arraigned in connection with an armed r6bberv during 
~
which one of the victims was killed, resp was placed in a ce~J 
with a person who had previously agreed to act as an informant. 
~-----..----.....__..~ 
The informant, Benny Lee, had been instructed to listen "to see 
if [he] could find ou~" the identity of petr's accomplices, but 
he had been told not to question petr in any way. The cell in 
which petr was placed overlooked the taxi garage in which the 
robbery took place. Immediately upon entering the cell petr ex-
pressed dismay over the view -- "somebody's messing with me be-
cause this is the place I'm accused of robbing" --and began to 
talk to Lee about the robbery. Petr told Lee that he had seen 
the robbers commit the crime and that he had picked UE some of - -
the money they dropped. Lee told petr that he had better think ------- ~ ----
of a more convincing story. 
Petr was later visited by his brother and learned that his 
family was very upset over the killing. 'Petr became agitated ~ 
and, when he next spoke to Lee, he admitted taking part in the ------robbery. Lee reported petr's inculpatory statement to the oo-
lice. 
Petr was indicted on counts of murder and felonious posses-
sion of a weapon. In response to a pretrial motion to suppress 
the statement made to Lee, the state (N.Y.) TC conducted a hear- /~ -
ing and concluded that Lee did not "interrogate" petr but only -listened and made notes. Because petr's statements were found to 
~
be voluntary and unsolicited, the TC denied the suppression mo-
tion. Petr was convicted on both counts of the indictment. The 
~L-+-' 
~pe~late Division affirmed the conviction, and the ~ourt of Ap-
peals denied leave to appeal. ,__1- .-1 _ A t+/ L-
t _ ~ 
Several years later, petr filed a habeas petn in the SDNY 
(Carter, J.), asserting that the admission of his statement to 
Lee violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment. ~elying on~ 
Massiah v. United States, 377 u.s. 201 (1964), the l)c held that ) 
the record did not show any questioning by Lee but onl.y spontane-
-~ -............ ------ t_..,/" ,;0 .1"1 
ous statements by petr. Accordingly, it denied th-e petn. r.A2 ._,.,. 
___.. P/1~ 
affirmed (Mehrtens rDJ], Blumenfeld [DJ] ~ Oakes, diss.), and this 
--0 
Court denied cert. 
In 1981 petr filed a motion in state court to vacate his 
conviction, contending that the admission of his statement to Lee 
. ~ 
was unconstitutional in the light of Un1ted States v. Henry, 447 
u.s. 264 (1980). This Court held in Henry that "rbJy intention-
ally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incrimi-
nating statements without the assistance of counsel, the r,overn-
ment violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id., at 
274. In denying petr's motion, the state court found Benry dis-
tinguishable in that Henry's cellmate was a paid government 
agent~ the court also held that Henry should not be applied ret-
roactively. The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. ~etr 
then filed a second habeas petn in the SDNY (Gagliardi), in which 






~~~ retrial without use of his statement to Lee. The DC denied the 
f) L .~tn. It noted the state 'J:'C' s findings that petr 's inculpatory 
~statement to Lee was a spontaneous response to the visit from 
petr's brother and that Lee did not make any affirmative efforts 
to elicit information from petr. The DC observed that 28 u.s.r.. 
' 
§2254 required that these findings be presumed correct, and it 
concluded that the findings were supported by the record. 
CA2 reversed. It first held that, despite the fact that ~)-J ( 
petr's claim for habeas relief was the same as that advanced in 
his first habeas petn, the "ends of justice" required that the 
court consider the merits of his claim. '!'he CA next concluded ~ 
that Henry was indistinguishable from petr's case; here, as in ~~ 
Henry, the government intentionally staged the scene that induced 
'--- -- ---..... ___ ---..._ ~ ...., 
petr to make the inculpatory statement, and the informant acted 
affirmatively to encourage the conversations that eventualJ.y led 
petr to make the statement. The r.A2 then held that Henry should ~ 
be applied retroactively, because Henry had not established a~f­
"new" rule of constitutional law, but rather had merely appliec'l~ 
~-~-~ Massiah to a new factual situation. 
Judge Van Graafeiland, in dissent, argued that the police ~ 
L - £?~ 
had overwhelming evidence of petr's guilt and that they placed ~
Lee in petr's cell to discover the identity of petr's accom-
plices, not to elicit inculpatory statements from petr. ~he rna-
jority's conclusion that Lee was "subtly interrogating" petr and 
that the government "deliberately elicited the inculpatory state-
ment" was contrary to the factual findings of the state court as 
well as the conclusions of the DC and the CA panel on petr's 
first habeas petn and the DC on this habeas petn, all of which 
determined that petr's statements were spontaneous and were not 
elicited in any way by the informant. In Judge Van Graafeiland's 
view, the majority had not adequately explained why the state 
court's findings were not fairly supported by the record, as re-
' 
quired by Sumner ~. Mata, 449 u.s. 539 (1981). Bebause three 
federal courts had concurred with the state court's findings, the 
need for such an explanation was even more imperative. ~he rna-
jority's boilerplate statement that the "ends of justice" justi-
fied reconsideration on the merits was not sufficient. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the CA erred by failing 
to apply ~2254's presumption of correctness to the state court's 
finding that Lee did not deliberately elicit the incriminating 
statement. 
Petr also contends that the Court should take this case to 
address the extent of a federal court's powers in ruling upon an 
argument raised in a successive habeas petn that was rejecte~ by 
the federal court that considered the previous petn. Tn Sanners 
v. United States, 373 u.s. 1 (1963), the Court implied that a 
previously rejected ground for habeas relief should not be recon-
sidered in the absence of some factor showing that review would 
serve the ends of justice, but the Court stopped short of mandat-
ing dismissal of a successive petn in the absence of any such 
factor. Petr suggests that Sanders should be expanded in accord-
ance with the principles of finality and deference to the role of 
the states in the federal system that the Court has emphasized in 
recent years. Petr asserts further that if Sanders may be viewed 
as permitting a federal court to reconsider a claim that has pre-
viously been litigated at every level of both the state and fe~-
eral judicial systems even though there has been no intervening 
change in the law and no other factors have been cited in support 
/ 
of the claim that further review will serve "the ends of 
justice," then it is time for the guid~lines announced in Sanders 
to be reexamined. The Court should require that a federal 
court's conclusion that the ends of justice would be served by 
reconsideration of a previously rejected claim be supported by 
articulable objective · factors relating to the particular case and 
include examination of both (a) the extent to which the alleged 
constitutional violation impugns the determination of guilt, and 
(b) the hardships that further review would impose on the state. 
Petr also asks the Court to take this case to clarify the 
import of Henry. The CA9 has complained that "ft]he extent to 
which Henry modified Massiah, if at all, is not entirely clear." 
United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1238, n. 3 (1981), cert. 
denied, 459 u.s. 942 (1982). Petr notes that Henry was decided 
on a sketchy record, and that it left open the question whether 
the inference of deliberate elicitation otherwjse present in 
Henry-like situations may be negated by direct evidence that the 
accused uttered the incriminating statements spontaneously or in 
response to impulses that were independent of the acts by the 
government and its agents. This case squarely presents that 
question and it also provides the full factual record developed 
at the pretrial suppression hearing. In clarifying Benry, the 
Court could also decide whether Fenry established a "new" consti-
tutional rule that should not be given retroactive effect in col-
lateral proceedings. 
4. DISCUSSION: Whether the government has "deliberately 
elicited" inculpatory statements from an accused in such a manner 
as to violate his right to counsel is not a purely factual issue. 
CA2 thus was correct not to feel bouno ' under ~2254(d) by the 
state court's determination that Lee did not deliberately elicit 
petr's incriminating statement. But the state court also con-
eluded that Lee simply listened and made notes, and there is mer-
it in the argument that the CA failed to accord to this conclu-
sion the deference required by §2254(d). 
Petr's argument that the Court should reexamine and extend 
} Sanders is persuasive, In this case, there was overwhelming evi-
dence of petr's guilt, and requiring the state to retry petr for 
a crime that occurred 13 years ago would entail significant hard-
ship. In this situation, it is difficult to see how the ends of 
justice are served by reconsideration of petr's previously re-
jected claim, especially since the police obviously made a good-
faith effort to comply with Massiah. And more generallv, as the 
stay applications to this Court make plain, the lower courts are 
in considerable confusion over the standards for evaluating abuse 
of the writ questions. "The ends of justice" is not a very help-
ful criterion. Sanders is the last time the Court spoke to the 
problem of successive petns, and petr is surely correct in sug-
gesting that the Court's attitude toward the problem has changed 
since Sanders. 
Finally, I agree with petr that Henry is a confusing deci-
sion that needs to be clarified. See also Sweat v. Arkansas, 105 
s.ct. 933, 936 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). If one accepts 
the state court's determination that Lee simply listened to petr 
and took notes, this case presents the situation left open in 
7 
I~ 
footnote 9 of Henry -- "the situation where an informant js 
placed in close p~oximity but makes n~ effort to stimulate con-
versations about the crime charged." 447 u.s., at 271, n. 9: see 
also id., at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring). The Court has granted 
cert in a case involving the application of Henry. Maine v. 
Moulton, No. 84-786. But the situation and issue in Moulton are 
quite different from the present case; Moulton concerns whether 
Henry is violated if, in the course of investigation of uncharged 
crimes, the police unintentionally obtain through an informant 
incriminating statements by the accused that relate to a crime 
for which he has been charged. The grant in Moulton thus is no 
reason to deny cert here. 
I recommend CFR with an e~nt. 
There is no response. 
April 26, 1985 Lightsey Opn in petn 
lfp/ss Olj03j86 HENDERSON SALLY-POW 
84-1479 Henderson v. Wilson (CA2) 
(Argued January 14, 1985) 
MEMO TO MY ANNE: 
Again we have a case that illustrates the 
irrelevance of guilt under our system - as Henry Friendly 
has observed. Respondent was tried and convicted in New 
York State court of murder and robbery. Even the majority 
opinion of CA2 recognized that respondent's guilt was 
"nearly overwhelming". There never was any question as to 
respondent's guilt. He had been seen by two witnesses 
fleeing the garage he had robbed, with "an armful of 
money" and accompanied by two other men. The police had 
no doubt as to respondent's guilt, but were anxious to 
identify the other two participants in the crime. 
Respondent was placed in a cell with Benny Lee \·7ho was 
being held on a different charge. The police requested 
Lee to listen to what respondent said, and particularly to 
"find out the names of the other two men who were 
involved". Lee testified that the police had instructed 
~
him not to "ask questions or question respondent in any 
way". Respondent talked rather freely, and admitted --taking part in the robbery. 
Lo 
The New York State trial court, after an 
evidentiary hearing, found that Lee did not "interrogate" 
petitioner but only listened and made notes. The 
Appellate Division affirmed respondent's conviction, and 
the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. 
Some years later, respondent filed his first federal 
habeas petition asserting that the admission of his 
statement to Lee violated his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment. He relied on Massiah. The DC concluded that 
the record did not show any questioning by Lee but only 
spontaneous statements by petitioner. 
and CA2 affirmed. We denied cert. 
Habeas was denied, 
In 1981 petitioner went back to state court, 
relying this time on the then recently decided case of 
United States v. Henry. The state trial court found that 
Henry was distinguishable in that the cellmate there was a 
paid government agent who had interrogated the suspect. 
'!·he court accordingly denied relief, and the Appellate 
Division denied leave to appeal. 
Petitioner then filed a second habeas petition, 
on Henry and also argued that it 
The DC denied the petition, noting 
court had found that respondent's 
in which he relied 
applied retroactively. 
that the state trial 
..... 
inculpatory statement to Lee was a spontaneous response 
and that Lee had not made any affirmative efforts to 
elicit information from the respondent. The DC correctly 
observed that §2254 required that these findings are 
presumeded to be correct. This time CA2 reversed, with 
Judge VanGraafeiland dissenting. It held that Henry was 
retroactive because it had not established ~ new rule of 
constitutional law, and it simply ignored the findings of 
both the New York State courts and the two federal 
District Court that previously had reviewed this case. 
I agree with Judge VanGraafeiland's dissent. The 
CA2 majority inexplicably failed to accord proper 
deference to the factual findings made by the state trial 
court on two occasions, and accepted as correct by two 
different federal District Court in the two habeas corpus 
proceedings. Moreover, these findings also had been 
accepted by CA2 on the first appeal. Although the Court's 
opinion in Henry may not be one of our clearest, this case 
is distinguishable from HeD.f..Y_. The basic ~rror of CA2, 
however, was in ignoring the requirement of Summer v. 
Mata, 449 u.s., at 548-49 to the effect that federal 
courts in habeas corpus cases must defer to purely factual 
findings by the state courts. 
q. 
Unless there is something 1 have completely 
over looked, we should have summarily reversed this case. 






To: Mr. Justice Powell January 14, 1986 
From: Anne 
No. 84-1479, Henderson v. Wilson 
(cert. to CA2) (argument January 14, 1985) 
Questions Presented 
In the absence of an intervening change in the law or any 
other compelling factor, do principles of finality of habeas 
corpus litigation preclude a federal court from reconsidering an 
issue that has been fully adjudicated by the federal district and 
appellate courts pursuant to a previous petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus?l 
lr have omitted four of the questions presented by petitioner 





Resp was arrested for murder and was placed in a cell with 
Benny Lee, who had agreed to act as an informant for the officer 
investigating the crime. During the time that he shared the cell 
with Lee, resp made incriminating statements, which Lee reported 
to the officer. Prior to trial, resp moved to suppress the 
statements. Following a hearing, at which Lee and the 
supervising officer testified, the state trial court determined 
that the officer had instructed Lee not to question petr, but 
merely to listen to anything that resp might say, and that Lee 
obeyed these instructions. The trial court found that resp • s 
incriminating utterances "were spontaneous and not a result of 
any interrogation by Lee." Therefore, the court ruled that the 
statements were admissible at trial. 
Resp was convicted, and the state appellate courts 
affirmed his convictions. Thereafter, resp filed his first 
federal habeas petition in the DC. The DJ evaluated, among 
others, resp's claim that his incriminating statements to Lee 
improperly were admitted at trial in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, 377 
u.s. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the Court held that a defendant was 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
the issue on which this case may be resolved is very complicated. 
As I hope that the discussion in my memo shows, the appropriate 
analysis is reflected in your opinion for the Court in Stone v. 
Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976), and your concurring opinions in Rose 
v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545, 579 (1979) and in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 u.s. 218, 250 (1973). 
Jo 
denied his right to counsel when "there, was used against him at 
trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal 
agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been 
indicted and in the absence of counsel." !d., at 206 (emphasis 
/ 
added}. The DC rejected the claim on the ground that the record 
showed that Lee had not conducted an interrogation of resp and -- ~- ...... -
that resp's statements were spontaneous. 
v 
On appeal, a divided panel of CA2 affirmed the DC's 
decision denying relief. The majority reasoned that the 
"deliberately elicited" test of Massiah was not met because of ------ __ , ______________ '-----------------------~-
the "complete absence of interrogation" in this case. In this 
connection, CA2 noted that the state TC's factual determinations 
were entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S.C. 
§2254 (d) • The court also decided that the fact that Lee 
surreptitiously was placed in resp 's cell did not change the 
outcome: "When a defendant makes a completely unsolicited, C/l2... 
incriminating remark in a face-to-face encounter with an 
informant, he knowingly assumes the risk that his confidant may 
ultimately prove to be untrustworthy." Judge Oakes dis sen ted, 
reasoning that on these facts the State had "deliberately 
elicited" the incriminating remarks. This Court denied cert., 
442 u.s. 945 (1979). 
Then, this Court decided United States v. Henry, 447 u.s. 
264 (1980). In Henry, the Court considered the question whether 
under the particular facts the Government had "deliberately 
elicited" incriminating statements from the defendant in 
violation of his right to counsel as construed in Massiah. The 
4. 
Court found that the "combination of circumstances" , in the case, 
which involved a jail house in~nt paid to furnish information 
.._ --::::!""----
about incriminating statements to the Government, supported CA4's 
finding of a Massiah violation. The Court left open the question 
whether the Sixth Amendment would be violated by admission of 
statements to an informant who served simply as a "listening 
post," making no efforts to initiate the conversation. Id., at 
271 n. 9. In your concurring opinion in Henry, you expressed 
your understanding of the Court's holding: "(T]he mere presence 
of a jailhouse informant who had been instructed to overhear 
conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some 
conversations would not necessarily be unconstitutional. In such 
a case, the question would be whether the informant's actions 
constituted deliberate and 'surreptitious interrogatio[n]' of the 
defendant. If they did not, then there would be no interference 
with the right to counsel." Id., at 276. (Similarly, the 
v 
Court's recent decision in Maine v. Moulton, No. 84-786, does not 
reach the situation where the informant "does not participate in 
active conversation and prompt particular replies," slip op., at 
17 n. 13) • 
The decision in United States v. Henry prompted resp in 
this case to file his second federal habeas petition. The DC 
denied relief on the ground that it could not reach a claim 
squarely rejected in a prior CA2 decision on the basis of a 
wa-~ ,___ ~--...-------------_ .... __ _ 
subsequent Supreme Court decision that expressly failed to reach 
the claim. -.-. Relying on your concurring opinion in Henry, the DC 
also decided that the case presented no Sixth Amendment violation 
5. 
because the "r ! cord , ~-t_a __ b l_i_s_h_e_~_t_h_:_:_ L_e_e_' _s _ a_:__t.._ _ i s ns did \ 
not constitute surreptitious interro ation." 
A different, and divided, panel of CA2 reversed and 
ordered the DC to grant the writ. As an initial matter, the 
majority decided that the "ends of justice" required a 
consideration of the merits of resp's second habeas petition. 
CA2 then reviewed Henry and decided that the facts of this case 
were substantially similar to those of Henry. The court 
reasoned that Henry did not announce a new constitutional rule 
and thus was fully applicable to this case, without reference to 
retroactivity analysis. Finally, the majority decided that the 
facts of this case satisfied the "deliberate elicitation" test in 
light of the decision in Henry. Judge Van Graafeiland dissented, 
noting that the majority conceded that proof · of resp's guilt was 
"nearly overwhelming." Judge Van Graafeiland criticized the --------panel for failing to give proper deference under 28 u.s.c. 
§2254 (d) to the fact-finding of the state court and for failing 
to explain why, in the absence of an intervening change in the 
law, the "ends of justice" now required relief. 
Discussion 
This case presents the Court with~~ to 
present clear guidance on when the lower federal courts properly 
should decline to entertain a successive habeas petition raising 
grounds rejected on a prior petition. As one argument for 
reversal, the State argues that, if the Court reaches the merits, 
the Court should hold that the facts as found by the state TC do 
not amount to "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating 
6. 
statements in violation of the right , to counse~ within the 
meaning of Henry and Mass iah. In my view, the Court should not 
reach straight for the merits without first passing on the 
important question of whether the lower courts properly 
entertained this petition. Such an approach would beg the 
important question presented for review, namely, whether the 
lower courts even should have considered the merits of this 
petition. Indeed, by going straight to the merits, the Court 
would suggest that it was proper to do so. 
I will state my analysis of this question briefly. The 
appropriate reasoning is, I believe, reflected in your opinion 
for the Court in Stone v. Powell, and in your concurring opinions 
in Rose v. Mitchell and in Schneckloth v. Bustamante. 
In Sanders v. United States, 373 u.s. 1 (1963), the Court 
gave guidance on when it was proper for a federal court to refuse 
to entertain successive habeas petitions raising grounds heard 
and determined on a prior petition. The Court stated that 
controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior petition 
"only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent 
application was determined adversely to the applicant on the 
prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, 
and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the 
merits of the subsequent application." !d., at 15. In reasoning 
that CA2 erred in concluding that the "ends of justice" required 
consideration of resp's successive petition, the State makes a 
somewhat extreme argument that turns on omission from the current 
habeas statute covering state prisoners of any reference to "ends 
., . 
of justice." 28 u.s.c. §2244(b). In ~ffect, the State argues 
' 
that Congress rejected an "ends of justice" inquiry and imposed 
the requirement that the successive petition raise a new claim. 
I do not believe that the extreme form of the State's argument 
should be adopted, though some of its statutory analysis may be 
helpful. As drafted, section 2244 (b) plainly does import some 
concept of finality into habeas corpus proceedings. But the 
section is written in discretionary language; it states that the 
federal court "need not" consider the successive writ unless it 
raises a new factual or legal claim. Within that discretion must 
be some room to inquire into the "ends of justice." Accordingly, 
1 think that the focus of inquiry here must be what does the 
phrase "ends of justice" mean in this context. 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976), the Court held 
that, absent a showing that the State did not afford a full and 
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner was 
not entitled to federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was admitted 
at his trial. The Court noted that such a Fourth Amendment claim 
did not raise any doubt as to the prisoner's guilt or innocence. 
Indeed, the evidence sought to be excluded typically is reliable 
evidence of guilt. In this context, the Court observed that 
federal habeas corpus review "results in serious intrusions on 
values important to our system of government," especially where 
it is for "purposes other than to assure no innocent person 
suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty." !d., at 491 n. 31 
(emphasis added) • But federal habeas relief is afforded to 
H. 
provide an "additional safeguard against compelling an innocent 
man to suffer" such loss of liberty. Id., at 491-492 n. 31. 
./ 
Similarly, in your concurring opinion in vSchneckloth v. 
Bustamante, in which you proposed the rule ultimately adopted in 
Stone v. Powell, you observed that recent decisions tended to 
"depreciate the the importance of the finality" of prior criminal 
judgments. 412 u.s. at 256. This trend might be "a justifiable 
evolution of the use of habeas corpus where the one in state 
custody raises a constitutional claim bearing on his innocence." 
Ibid. But, where the issue sought to be raised on federal habeas 
did not bear on the prisoner's innocence, the "justification for 
disregarding the historic scope and function of the writ" was not 
apparent. Ibid. You emphasized that federal habeas corpus was 
intended to afford means for "redressing an unjust 
incarceration." Id., at 257-258 (emphasis added) • This 
discussion suggests that incarceration is "unjust" where the 
prisoner raises a claim that casts doubt on his guilt. See id., 
at 265. 
Your concurring opinion in Rose v. Mitchell is to 1 ike 
effect. There, you observed that habeas corpus assures society 
"that no innocent persons will be incarcerated." 443 u.s. at 
---~
586. You further suggested that the disruption caused by federal 
habeas review was unjustified unless the prisoner sought to raise 
a claim that touched on his guilt or innocence. !£., at 588 n. 
10. 
Accordingly, in these opinions, you explained that federal 
habeas corpus is designed to afford relief from "unjust" 
~-
incarceration and that incarceration is "unjust" when we have a 
colorable basis for believing that the prisoner is innocent. 
Though your discussion in these cases concerned habeas corpus 
generally, the discussion takes on added force in considering 
when a federal court should entertain a successive petition 
raising a claim adjudicated on a prior application. On first 
federal habeas, it may be appropriate to "extend the writ to 
cases in which the guilt of the incarcerated claimant is not an 
issue." Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 583 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that, even on first federal habeas, societal costs 
may weigh in favor of limiting relief to claims bearing on guilt 
or innocence). In light of the costs imposed by successive 
petitions, however, it makes little sense to relitigate claims 
that have nothing to do with whether an innocent person unjustly 
has been incarcerated. 
In that situation, I would argue that the "ends of 
justice" require consideration of the merits of the successive 
petition only if the prisoner • s constitutional claim had some 
bearing on his innocence. Such a claim would not merely be one 
in which the prisoner literally asserted that he was innocent, 
such as where he came forward with new evidence, but would 
encompass a claim casting doubt on the integrity of the fact-
finding process itself, such as where he unconstitutionally was 
denied right to counsel at trial. Moreover, the Court could 
require the prisoner to supplement his constitutional argument 
with a "'colorable claim of innocence.'" Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, supra, at 265-266 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 
lU. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collqteral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 u. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1960)). 
I would like to point out that, by adopting such a rule, 
the Court would not be treating state prisoners unfairly. Today, 
our pretrial and trial proceedings are governed by many 
procedural rules designed to protect the accused. Following 
conviction, the defendant has the right to direct appeal through 
the state system and ultimately to this Court. There is no 
question that direct appeal ordinarily will identify unfairness 
occurring at trial. Then, the prisoner has recourse to state 
habeas relief. On first federal habeas, decisions of this Court 
permit the prisoner to raise most types of constitutional claims. 
I have confidence that review by all of those courts will ensure 
that the prisoner has received the important procedural 
safeguards to which our system entitles him. These 
comprehensive direct and collateral review procedures assure us 
that the defendant has been properly convicted under fair trial 
and appellate procedures, and there seems no justification for 
entertaining further applications unless the prisoner can 
demonstrate that the constitutional claim sought to be raised 
suggests that he is innocent. Requiring the prisoner to make a 
"colorable" showing of innocence would ensure that further 
review of the allegations of the petition, which otherwise might 
be conclusory, was warranted. 
The decision of CA2 in this case demonstrates the need for 
guidance from this Court. CA2 acknowledged that the decision in 
Henry did not constitute a change in the law, but concluded that 
.1.1. 
resp should have the benefit of further, review in light of the 
' 
clarification provided by Henry. Since our law constantly is 
changing in the manner represented by the "change" from Massiah 
to Henry, there never wi 11 be an end to habeas review if CA2 's 
position was accepted. The approach that 1 propose would not 
permit review under these circumstances. The claim sought to be 
raised by resp casts absolutely no doubt on his guilt and does 
not suggest that he was treated so unfairly as to raise concern 
about the integrity of the fact-finding process. Under these 
circumstances, CA2 should not have entertained the petition. 
Conclusion 
On a successive petition for federal habeas corpus raising 
a claim adjudicated on the merits on a prior application, the 
"ends of justice" do not require the court to entertain the 
petition unless the claim sought to be raised bears on the 
prisoner's innocence and the prisoner makes a colorable showing 
of innocence. In this context, "innocence" would encompass a 
claim casting serious doubt on the integrity of the fact-finding 
process by which the prisoner was convicted. The prisoner would 
not be entitled to further review on the ground that a subsequent 
decision shed some new light on claims previously adjudicated 
unless the subsequent decision had bearing on the prisoner's 
"innocence." 
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Henderson v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis, 
I shall, of course, as soon as I 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
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Dear Lewis: 
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April 3, 1986 
No. 84-1479 Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
P.S. This excellent opinion takes a significant step in the 
right ctirec~on 1 n c Ontrolling successive petitions for 
habeas relief. I am delighted to join it. 
.;iupuuu <lJMtrl o-f flr.t ~nit.tb ~bd.t5 
Jlmdringhtn. ~. <!J. 21l&f"'&i 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 3, 1986 
Re: 84-1479 - Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis: 
I await the dissent. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,juprtutt <!):ttnrlttf tl£t ~tb .:itws 
._ufringhnt. ~. <!):. 2ll~~$ 
April 4, 1986 
Re: 84-1479 - Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF'" 
,jtt}tftmt Clfttttri ttf tlrt ~~ .itattS' 
~fringttttt. ~. elf. 20&iJl.~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 4, 1986 
84-1479 - Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis, 
I agree with Parts I, IV and V but 
reserve judgment on the rest. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
;&, g-c'f-l't7<1 /(~~ 
---:------. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
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May 29, 1986 
84-1479 Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
Dear Bvron: 
1 can, of course, understand your waiting to see 
the dissent before deciding whether to join Parts 11 and 111 
of my opinion in this case. If you will for.qive me for 
bothering you further at this time, 1 write this note. 
It occurred to me after nur brief and accidental 
talk on Saturday that it was your opinion in Barefoot, 463 
u.s., at 895, that first brought to my attention the impor-
tance of. the difference between "successive petitions" and 
"abuse of the writ" in habPas cases. bee n. 6, p. 7, in my 
draft opinion in this case. Although the ~ifference was 
identified clearly in Sanders v. u.s., 373 u.s., at 15-17, 
and we have relied on abuse of the writ several times in 
capital cases, I do not recall our having retied on the 
"successive petition" pronq of Sanders, now incorporated in 
Rule 9(b) of the rules governing S2254 cases. 
This case gives us an opportunity to do what you, 
Bill Rehnquist and 1 - i.n parti.cular - have sought to do, 
namely, establish that a successive habeas petition will be 
rejected unless the defendant carries his burden of coming 





.:iu:pumt QI4tnri ttt tlrt ~ro .:itatt.s' 
~~·~·<4· 20~~~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 9, 1986 
84-1479 - Kuhlmann v . Wilson 
Dear Lewis, 
I continue to agree with Parts I, IV and 
V of your circulating draft. Parts II and 
III are difficult for me in light of Sanders 
and the history of the 1966 amendments. They 
are also unnecessary to the judgment, and I 
do not join them. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
i'tt.puutt ~~ 1tf tlf~ ~niUb ~mug 
'JJ'Mlrittgtott. ~. ~· 2.11.;m~ 
Re: No. 84-1479, Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis: 
June 12, 1986 
J 
I am where Byron is. I join parts I, IV and V of 




cc: The Conference 
arne 06/25/86 
June 25, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-1479, Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
The following is a draft hand-down speech for this case: 
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit granting relief to respondent 
on his successive petition for habeas corpus. 
Prior to his trial for murder in New York court, respond-
ent moved to suppress statements he made to a jailhouse informant 
on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right 
to counsel. After a hearing, the trial court found that the in-
formant asked respondent no questions and merely listened to his 
spontaneous remarks. The court denied the suppression motion. 
Following direct appeal, respondent unsuccessfully sought 
habeas corpus relief, in both federal and state court, arguing 
that his statements to the informant were obtained in violation 
of his right to counsel. Later, he filed a second petition for 
federal habeas corpus review, alleging that United States v. Hen-
..£:1_, 447 u.s. 264 (1980), supported his Sixth Amendment claim. 
The District Court denied relief because the state court's find-
ings showed that the informant made no effort of any kind to 
J 
page 2. 
elicit information from respondent. The Court of Appeals re-
versed, reasoning that the facts of this case were indistinguish-
able from the facts of Henry. 
We now reverse. As the District Court properly conclud-
ed, a criminal defendant does not establish a Sixth Amendment 
violation merely by showing that an informant reported his state-
ments to the police. Our cases establish that, once a defend-
ant's right to counsel has attached, he is denied that right when 
police "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements from him in 
the absence of counsel. That standard is designed to protect 
defendants from surreptitious interrogation or investigative 
techniques that are the equivalent of interrogation. Therefore, 
the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their inform-
ant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed 
to elicit incriminating remarks. 
The Court of Appeals in this case failed to accord to the 
state court's findings of fact the presumption of correctness 
required by 28 u.s.c. §2254(d). Giving those findings the weight 
to which they are entitled, it is apparent that respondent has 
not established a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 
r-- The Chief Justice, and Justices White, Blackmun, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor join Parts I, IV, and V of my opinion. The 
Chief Justice, and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor also join 
Parts II and III. The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opin-
ion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, has filed a 
~ 






84-1479 Kuhlmann v. Wilson 
This case is here on cert to the Court of 
Appeals from the Second Circuit. 
Prior to his trial for murder in a New York 
Court,~espondent moved to suppress statements he had 
made to a jailhouse informant - claiming a violation of 
his right to counsel. After a hearing, the trial court 
found that the informant had asked no questions~nd 
? 
had merely listened to respondent's incriminating 
statements. Accordingly, the court denied the 
suppression motion. 
Following direct appeal, respondent sought 
habeas corpus relie~in both federal and state courts. 
~ ]felief was denied by each of these courts. 
After our decision in United States v. Henry 
(1980), respondent filed a second federal habeas 
petition, arguing that in light of Henrii?his statement 
should have been suppressed. Again, the federal 
District Court denied relief,/ but a different panel of 
the Court of Appeals reversed. It reasoned that the 
facts of this case were indistinguishable from those in 
Henry. 
we think the Court of Appeals erred. It 
failed to accord to the sta~e cour~s fi~dings of fac jl 
the presumption of correctness required by S2254(d~of 
the federal habeas statute. The facts in this case 
were quite different from those in Henry. ~ hlere the 
informant merely reported statements voluntarily made 
~~ 
by respondent. Every court that ~considered this case, 
/ state and federal j'has accepted the basic findings of 
fact that the Court of Appeals simply rejected. 
Therefore,( and for reasons more fully stated 
in our opinion today ;)we reverse the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. 
The Chief Justice, and Justices White, 
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor join Parts I, IV, and 
V of my opinion. The Chief Justice, and Justices 
Rehnquist and O'Connor also join Parts II and III. The 
Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion. Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, has filed a 
dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens also has filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
#84-1479 Kuhlmann v. Wilson (Anne) 
LFP for the Court 
1st draft 4/2/86 
2nd draft 6/16/86 
Joined by SOC 4/3/86 
WHR 4/4/86 
CJ 4/28/86 
BRW agrees with Parts I, IV and V 4/4/86 
BRW continues to agree with I, IV and V, but 
cannot join II and III - 6/9/86. 
HAB agrees with BRW 6/12/86 
CJ concurring 
1st draft 5/28/86 
JPS dissenting 
1st draft 6/9/86 
2nd draft 6/13/86 
WJB dissenting 
1st draft 6/11/86 
3rd draft 6/17/86 
4th draft 6/23/86 
Joined by TM 6/11/86 
WJB will dissent 4/3/86 
TM awaiting dissent 4/3/86 
JPS awaiting dissent 4/3/86 
June 29, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Allen v. Hardy, No. 85-6593 
No. 85-6748, Williams v. Illinois 
Petr, who is black, pleaded guilty to murder, and a 
jury sentenced him to death. 111. Sup. Ct. affirmed, People 
v. Williams, 97 111.2d 252 (1983), and we denied certiorari, 
466 u.s. 981 (1984). Petr then filed this petition for 
post-conviction relief in 111. Cir. Ct. That court dis-
missed the petition, and 111. Sup. Ct. affirmed. 
111. Sup. Ct. considered petr's contention that his 
constitutional rights were violated by the State's exercise 
of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury 
that sentenced him to death. The court noted that it had 
rejected this contention on direct appeal and that its deci-
sion there ordinarily would be res judicata. The court went 
on, however, to consider a study and an article offered by 
petr, holding that this evidence did not satisfy the stand-
ard of Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965). 
Seeking cert., petr summarizes the evidence in his 
case, which consists both of proof concerning the State's 
peremptory challenges at his trial and of data concerning 
the racial composition of juries seated in capital cases in 
Cook County, 111. Re claims that this evidence raised a 
prima facie case of purposeful, systematic exclusion. The 
State responds by arguing that, even if Batson v. Kentucky 
applies retroactively, petr's allegations are irrelevant 
becausP they focus on the standard of Swain. 
1 will vote to deny this petition. Although the facts 
concerning the State's use of peremptory challenges at 
petr's trial may well raise a prima facie case under Batson, 
Allen v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, holds that Batson does not 
apply on collateral review of a conviction that became final 
before our decision was announced. Petr's claim under Swain 
is not certworthy. 
My vote is to deny. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
July 1, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 85-1479 
No. 85-567, Wainwriqht v. Sonqer 
In 1974, resp was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death. On direct appeal, we GVR'd for resentencing under 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 u.s. 349 (1977). Songer v. Florida, 
430 u.s. 952 (1977). At resentencing, the TC refused to 
hear additional evidence and reimposed the death sentence 
for the same reasons originally relied upon. On direct ap-
peal, Fla. Sup. Ct. affirmed, rejecting resp's contention 
that the Fla. death penalty scheme violated Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 u.s. 586 (1978), by limiting admission and consideration 
of mitigating evidence to those categories of evidence list-
ed in the statute, 365 So.2d 696 {1978), cert. ~enied, 441 
u.s. 956 (1979). 
Resp then unsuccessfully sought state habeas corpus 
relief by filing a Rule 3.850 motion. After a hearing, the 
trial court denied relief and the Florida Supreme Court af-
firmed. Songer v. State, 419 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1982). Resp 
also was unsuccessful in his subsequent attempt to obtain 
federal habeas corpus relief. The federal DC considered 
resp's claim under Lockett as part of an ineffective assist-
ance argument, concluding that counsel's failure to put on 
nonstatutory mitigating evidence was a reasonable mistake. 
The DC denied relief, CAll affirmed without discussing the 
Lockett issue, 733 F.2d 788, and we denied cert., No. 84-
5690 (1985). 
Resp again sought post-conviction relief in state 
court. In this proceeding, the original TJ stated that at 
the time of resp's trial, he had interpreted the Fla. stat-
ute as requiring him to consider only those categories of 
mitigating evidence listed in the statute. The iudge also 
suggested that he had not considered any nonstatutory miti-
gating evidence. But the TJ denied relief, and Fla. Sup. 
Ct. affirmed, 463 So.2d 229 (1985). 
Resp then filed his second petition for federal habeas 
corpus relief. The DC dismissed the application on the 
grounds that the ends of justice would not be served by re-
consideration of the issues presented. Sitting en bane, 
CAll reversed and remanded, ~ith instructions to the DC to 
2. 
order the State to hold a new sentencing hearing. The court 
reasoned that the TJ's statements demonstrated new and dif-
ferent grounds for relief that resp could not have raised on 
his first federal habeas petition. The court concluded that 
the TJ's failure to consider any nonstatutory mitigating 
evidence constituted a clear violation of Lockett and 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104 (1982). 
We held this petition for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, No. 84-
1479, because the cert. petition filed by the Fla. prison 
warden argues that CAll erred in concluding that the ••ends 
of justice" would be served by reconsideration of the merits 
of this successive petition. A GVR in liqht of Wilson would 
not be appropriate since our iudgment there did not rest on 
the standard that should govern successive review. More-
over, the standard adopted by the plurality in Wilson per-
tains to successive review of a conviction, while this case 
involves review of a death sentence. 
1 recommend that we hold this petition for Hitchcock v. 
Wainwright, No. 85-6756 (cert. granted June 9, 1986). In 
Hitchcock, we wtll consider Florida's pre-Lockett rule, 
which may have ha~ the effect of ~imiting introduction of 
mitiqating evidence to c~rt~in categories provided in the 
statute. ~A1l'g decision here r.ested on its conclusion 
that such rule violated our holrlinqs in Lockett and Eddings, 
and our disposition in Bitchock will she~ liqht on the ques-
tion whether CAll's decision was ~orrect. 
~V vote is to hold for Hitchcock v. Wainwriqht, No. 85-
6756. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
July 1, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCB 
Re: Cases Held for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 85-1479 
No. 85-276, Lockhart v. Walker 
Resp was convicted for a murder that occurred in 1963, 
and sentenced to death. Ark. Sup. Ct. remanded for a new 
trial. Prior to retrial, resp unsuccessfully moved to re-
cuse the TJ on the ground that the TJ was biased against 
him. Resp again was convicted and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 'l'he conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, 
Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300 (1966), cert. denied, 386 u.s. 
682 (1967) • 
Resp filed his first petition for federal habeas relief, 
alleging that the TJ was biased and that the prosecutor sup-
pressed exculpatory evidence. The DC denied the writ, and 
CA8 affirmed. Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (CA8 1969). 
ln 1981, resp filed a second federal habeas petition. Ap-
plying the guidelines set out in Sanders v. United States, 
373 u.s. 1 (1963), the DC refused to permit resp to 
relitiqate his claims concerning the TJ's bias and the 
State's suppression of evidence. Sitting en bane, CA8 af-
firmed, over the dissent of four judges, on the ground that 
resp failed to establish that the "ends of justice" would be 
served by successive review. Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 
1238 (CAS 1984). 
Resp moved for recall of CAS's mandate on the basis of 
"newly discovered evidence." CAS ordered the DC to hold a 
hearing to consider the new evidence. After the hearing, 
the DC again decided that the ends of justice did not re-
quire reconsideration of resp's claims. Among the items of 
evidence allegedly suppressed by the State was a transcript 
of a conversation that took place in 1963 between resp's 
confederate and the confederate's sister, in which the con-
federate made statements suggesting that it was he, and not 
resp, who had committed the murder. The en bane CAS re-
versed, again over the dissent of four judges. 
CAB's rested its decision on two separate grounds. 
First, the court considered "whether the new evidence suffi-
ciently tips the balance of the ends of justice standard to 
permit us to reconsider" resp's claims. The appropriate 
standard for making this determination was "not whether the 
2. 
district court or this court would find the new evidence 
credible, but whether the evidence possesses sufficient 
credibility that it should be heard by the real factfinder: 
the jury." CAS assessed the new evidence under that stand-
ard and decided that the evidence created "sufficient addi-
tional doubt" about resp's quilt so that the ends of justice 
required successive review. The court held that resp was 
entitled to relief on the ground that the TJ's bias denied 
him a fair trial. 
Second, the court determined that the suppressed tran-
script, which is described above, consti.tuted a "separate 
and independent ground" for granting habeas relief. The 
court noted that "where the defendant has made general re-
quests for all exculpatory material, the conviction will be 
set aside only if 'the omitted evidence creates a reasonable 
doubt that did not otherwise exist.'" Quoting United States 
v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97, 108 (1976}). CA8 determined that the 
transcript was authentic, that it would be admissible in 
evidence at trial, that it had been suppressed by the State, 
and that it was both favorable to resp and material on the 
question of his guilt. With respect to the issue of materi-
ality, CA8 concluded that the transcript itself was "suffi-
cient to create a reasonable doubt" about resp's quilt. 
Therefore, suppression of the transcript violated resp·~ 
right to due process and constituted an lndependent ground 
for federal habeas relief. 
The Arkansas prison wftr~en has filed a cert. petition, 
challenging CA8's conclusion respecting the TJ's bias, its 
standard for deciding when n~w evidence iustifies successive 
review, and its determination that the transcript was au-
thentic. We held the petition for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, No. 
84-1479. A GVR in light of ~itson would not be aPPropriate, 
since our judgment did not rest on the standard governing 
successive review. 
Although CAS's "endq of justice" analysis was dubious, 
my vote is to deny this petition. The alternative ground 
for CAS's decision, i.e., its holding on the Brady viola-
tion, appears to be consistent with our cases. This case 
was decided prior to our decision in United States v. 
Bagley, 105 s.ct. 3375 (1985), which sets out the standard 
of materiality to be applied in evaluating a Brady viola-
tion. But CAS's conclusion on this issue is not inconsist-
ent with Bagley. Since CAB's iudgment rests on this inde-
pendent ground, and its conclusion on that ground appears 
correct, further review is not warranted. 
3. 
My vote is to deny. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
July 1, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Kuhlmann v . Wilson, 85-1479 
No. 85-567, Wainwright v. Songer 
ln 1974, resp was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death. On direct appeal, we GVR'd for resentencing under 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 u.s . 349 (1977). Songer v. Florida, 
430 u.s. 952 (1977). At resentencing, the TC refused to 
hear additional evidence and reimposed the death sentence 
for the same reasons originally relied upon. On direct ap-
peal, Fla. Sup. Ct. affirmed, rejecting reap's contention 
that the Fla. death penalty scheme violated Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 u.s. 586 (1978), by limiting admission and consideration 
of mitigatinq evidence to those categories "f evi1ence list-
ed in the statute, 365 So.2d 696 (1978), cert. denied, 441 
u.s. 956 (1979). 
Resp then unsucces~fully sougl)t state habeas corPlS 
relief by filing a Rule 3.850 motion. After a hearing, the 
trial court denied relief and the Florida Supreme Court af-
firmed. Sonr:ter v. State, 419 So.2rl 1044 ( .Flll'l. 1.982). Resp 
also was unsuccessful in his subsequent attempt to obtain 
federal habeas corpus relief. The federal DC considered 
resp's claim under Lockett as part of an ineffective assist-
ance argument, concluding that counsel's failure to put on 
nonstatutory mitigating evidence was a reasonable mistake. 
The DC denied relief, CAll affirmed wi.thout discussing the 
Lockett issue, 733 F.2d 788, and we denied cert ., No. 84-
5690 (1985). 
Resp again sought post-conviction relief in state 
court. In this proceeding, the original TJ stated that at 
the time of resp's trial, he had interpreted the Fla. stat-
ute as requiring him to consider only those categories of 
mitigating evidence listed in the statute . The judge also 
suggested that he had not considered any nonstatutory miti-
gating evidence . But the TJ denied relief, and Fla. Sup . 
Ct. affirmed, 463 So.2d 229 (1985). 
Resp then filed his second petition for federal habeas 
corpus relief . The DC dismissed the application on the 
grounds that the ends of justice would not be served by re-
consideration of the issues presented. Sitting en bane , 
CAll reversed. The court reasoned that the TJ's statements 
2. 
demonstrated new and different grounds for relief that resp 
could not have raised on his first federal habeas petition. 
The court concluded that the TJ's failure to consider any 
nonstatutory mitigating evidence constituted a clear viola-
tion of Lockett and Eddi.ngs v. Oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104 
(1982) • 
We held this petition for Kuhlmann v. Wilson, No. 84-
1479, because the cert. petition filed by the Fla. prison 
warden argues that CAll erred in concluding that the "ends 
of justice" would be served by reconsideration of the merits 
of this successive petition. A GVR in light of Wilson would 
not be appropriate since our judgment there did not rest on 
a decision respecting the standard federal courts should 
apply when confronted with a successive petition for habeas 
corpus relief. 
1 recommend that we hold this petition for Hitchcock v. 
Wainwright, No. 85-6756, in which we will consider Florida's 
pre-Lockett rule, which may have had the effect of limiting 
introduction of mitigating evidence to certain categories 
provided in the statute. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1479 
R. H. KUHLMANN, SUPERINTENDENT, SULLIVAN 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, PETITIONER v. 
JOSEPH ALLAN WILSON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts 
I, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III 
in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join. 
This case requires us to define the circumstances under 
which federal courts should entertain a state prisoner's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus that raises claims rejected on a 
prior petition for the same relief. 
I 
In the early morning of July 4, 1970, respondent and two 
confederates robbed the Star Taxicab Garage in the Bronx, 
New York, and fatally shot the night dispatcher. Shortly 
before, employees of the garage had observed respondent, a 
former employee there, on the premises conversing with two 
other men. They also witnessed respondent fleeing after the 
robbery, carrying loose money in his arms. After eluding 
the police for four days, respondent turned himself in. Re-
spondent admitted that he had been present when the crimes 
took place, claimed that he had witnessed the robbery, gave 
the police a description of the robbers, but denied knowing 
them. Respondent also denied any involvement in the rob-
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tails of his original account. Respondent then received a 
visit from his brother, who mentioned that members of his 
family were upset because they believed that respondent had 
murdered the dispatcher. After the visit, respondent again 
described the crimes to Lee. Respondent now admitted that 
he and two other men, whom he never identified, had 
planned and carried out the robbery, and had murdered the 
dispatcher. Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements 
and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surrep-
titiously while sharing the cell with respondent. 
After hearing the testimony of Cullen and Lee, 2 the trial 
court found that Cullen had instructed Lee "to ask no ques-
tions of [respondent] about the crime but merely to listen as 
to what [respondent] might say in his presence." The court 
determined that Lee obeyed these instructions, that he "at 
no time asked any questions with respect to the crime," and 
that he "only listened to [respondent] and made notes regard-
ing what [respondent] had to say." The trial court also 
found that respondent's statements to Lee were "spontane-
ous" and "unsolicited." Under state precedent, a defend-
ant's volunteered statements to a police agent were admissi-
ble in evidence because the police were not required to 
prevent talkative defendants from making incriminating 
statements. See People v. Kaye, 25 N. Y. 2d 139, 145, 250 
N. E. 2d 329, 332 (1969). The trial court accordingly denied 
the suppression motion. 
The jury convicted respondent of common law murder and 
felonious possession of a weapon. On May 18, 1972, the trial 
court sentenced him to a term of twenty years to life on the 
murder count and to a concurrent term of up to seven years 
on the weapons count. The Appellate Division affirmed 
without opinion, People v. Wilson, 41 App. Div. 2d 903, 343 
N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1973), and the New York Court of Appeals 
denied respondent leave to appeal. 
2 Respondent did not testify at the suppression hearing. 
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On December 7, 1973, respondent filed a petition for fed-
eral habeas corpus relief. Respondent argued, among other 
things, that his statements to Lee were obtained pursuant to 
police investigative methods that violated his constitutional 
rights. After considering Massiah v. United States, 377 
U. S. 201 (1964), the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York denied the writ on January 7, 1977. The record 
demonstrated "no interrogation whatsoever" by Lee and 
"only spontaneous statements" from respondent. In the 
District Court's view, these "fact[s] preclude[d] any Sixth 
Amendment violation." 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d 1185 (1978). 
The court noted that a defendant is denied his Sixth Amend-
ment rights when the trial court admits in evidence incrimi-
nating statements that state agents "'had deliberately elic-
ited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of 
counsel."' ld., at 1189, quoting Massiah v. United States, 
supra, at 206. Relying in part on Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U. S. 387 (1977), the court reasoned that the "deliberately 
elicited" test of M assiah requires something more than in-
criminating statements uttered in the absence of counsel. 
On the facts found by the state trial court, which were enti-
tled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2254(d), the court held that respondent had not established 
a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 3 We denied a pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari. Wilson v. Henderson, 442 
u. s. 945 (1979). 
3 The Court of Appeals observed that suppression of respondent's state-
ments would serve "no useful purpose" because Cullen had not engaged in 
"reprehensible police behavior," but rather had made a "conscious effort" 
to protect respondent's "constitutional rights [under Massiah] while pursu-
ing a crucial homicide investigation." Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d, at 
1191. 
Judge Oakes dissented, arguing that the "deliberately elicited" test of 
Massiah proscribed admission in evidence of an accused's statements ob-
tained pursuant to the investigatory tactics used here. I d., at 1194-1195. 
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Following this Court's decision in United States v. Henry, 
447 U. S. 264 (1980), which applied the Massiah test to sup-
press statements made to a paid jailhouse informant, re-
spondent decided to relitigate his Sixth Amendment claim. 
On September 11, 1981, he filed in state trial court a motion 
to vacate his conviction. The judge denied the motion, on 
the grounds that Henry was factually distinguishable from 
this case, 4 and that under state precedent Henry was not to 
be given retroactive effect, see People v. Pepper, 53 N. Y.2d 
213, 423 N. E. 2d 366 (1981). The Appellate Division denied 
respondent leave to appeal. 
On July 6, 1982, respondent returned to the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York on a habeas petition, 
again arguing that admission in evidence of his incriminating 
statements to Lee violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 
Respondent contended that the decision in Henry constituted 
a new rule of law that should be applied retroactively to this 
case. The District Court found it unnecessary to consider 
retroactivity because it decided that Henry did not under-
mine the Court of Appeals' prior disposition of respondent's 
Sixth Amendment claim. Noting that Henry reserved the 
question whether the Constitution forbade admission in evi-
dence of an accused's statements to an informant who made 
"no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged," see United States v. Henry, supra, at 271, n. 9, 
the District Court believed that this case presented that open 
question and that the question must be answered negatively. 
The District Court noted that the trial court's findings were 
presumptively correct, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), and were 
fully supported by the record. The court concluded that 
these findings were "fatal" to respondent's claim under 
Henry since they showed that Lee made no "affirmative ef-
fort" of any kind "to elicit information" from respondent. 
' The trial judge found that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 
(1980), was distinguishable because the jailhouse informant in that case 
was paid for reporting the defendant's statements to the police. 
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A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Ap-
peals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741 (1984). 
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact 
that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to 
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned 
that the circumstances under which respondent made his in-
criminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from 
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry 
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new 
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to 
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejected 
respondent's claim had erred, and remanded the case to the 
District Court with instructions to order respondent's release 
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5 
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. -- (1985), to consider 
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition 
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the 
facts of this case. We now reverse. 
II 
A 
In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respond-
ent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals 
5 Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority con-
ceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed con-
duct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now un-
constitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the 
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respond-
ent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual deter-
minations. /d., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregard-
ing "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings 
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relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), 
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow 
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "succes-
sive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in 
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28 
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the 
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ. 
I d., at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that 
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern 
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sand-
ers framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the 
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas 
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner 
on a prior petition if "the ends of justice would not be served 
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." I d., 
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on 
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sand-
ers provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof 
that a prisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of jus-
tice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously 
decided against him. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates 
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opin-
are not fairly supported by the record." /d., at 749. In Judge Van 
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' jus-
tify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has 
gone on before." Ibid. (citations omitted). 
'The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct 
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised 
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U. S., at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circum-
stances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of 
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the 
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition 
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, 
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle(s] him to the relief he seeks," 
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that 
the prisoner has abused the writ. /d., at 17-19. 
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ion of the Court of Appeals sheds no light on this important 
threshold question, merely declaring that the "ends of jus-
tice" required successive federal habeas corpus review. 
Failure to provide clear guidance leaves district judges "at 
large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus," 
creating the danger that they will engage in "the exercise not 
of law but of arbitrariness." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 
497 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). This Court therefore 
must now define the considerations that should govern fed-
eral courts' disposition of successive petitions for habeas 
corpus. 
B 
Since 1867, when Congress first authorized the federal 
courts to issue the writ on behalf of persons in state custody, 7 
this Court often has been called upon to interpret the lan-
guage of the statutes defining the scope of that jurisdiction. 
It may be helpful to review our cases construing these fre-
quently used statutes before we answer the specific question 
before us today. 
Until the early years of this century, the substantive scope 
of the federal habeas corpus statutes was defined by refer-
ence to the scope of the writ at common law, where the 
courts' inquiry on habeas was limited exclusively "to the ju-
risdiction of the sentencing tribunal." Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 475 (1976). See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 
72, 78, 79 (1977); see also Oaks, Legal History in the High 
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 458-468 
(1966). Thus, the finality of the judgment of a committing 
court of competent jurisdiction was accorded absolute respect 
on habeas review. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
7 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, the first grant of 
jurisdiction to the federal courts, included authority to issue the writ of ha-
beas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of federal prisoners. In 1867, Con-
gress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the 
custody of the States. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 474-475 (1976). 
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U. S. 218,254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During 
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on 
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of 
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed 
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright 
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
475-478. The Court initially accomplished this expansion 
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing 
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79. 
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction 
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims 
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and 
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 
104-105 (1942). 
Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope 
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed 
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes a state prison-
er's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the pris-
oner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amend-
ment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Al-
though the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of 
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded 
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth 
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially cre-
ated exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by 
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational sys-
tem of criminal justice." I d., at 494. Among those costs 
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a crimi-
nal trial "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence," 
and exclusion of reliable evidence that was "often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant." I d., at 490. Our decision to except this cate-
gory of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger 
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that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an in-
nocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." 
Id., at 491-492 n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who 
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was 
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[d] no 
bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." I d., at 492, 
n. 31. 
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the 
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes 
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas 
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by eq-
uitable principles." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963), 
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573 
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the 
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to 
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in 
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at 
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as 
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus 
were offended when a conviction was issued by a court that 
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intoler-
able convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional 
commands. But the Court never has defined the scope of 
the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure 
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of 
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its 
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests 
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitu-
tional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the 
state courts. E. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129 
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia, 
supra, at 426-434. 8 
8 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our cases deciding that federal 
habeas review ordinarily does not extend to procedurally defaulted claims 
plainly concern the "general scope of the writ." Post, at 3. The point of 
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The Court in Sanders drew the phrase "ends of justice" di-
rectly from the version of 28 U. S. C. § 2244 in effect in 1963. 
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both 
federal and state prisoners, stated in relevant part that no 
federal judge "shall be required to entertain an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a 
person . . . , if it appears that the legality of such detention 
has been determined" by a federal court "on a prior applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no 
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and 
the judge . . . is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be 
served by such inquiry." 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1964) (empha-
sis added). Accordingly, in describing guidelines for succes-
sive petitions, Sanders did little more than quote the lan-
guage of the then-pertinent statute, leaving for another day 
the task of giving that language substantive content. 
In 1966, Congress carefully reviewed the habeas corpus 
statutes and amended their provisions, including § 2244. 
Section 2244(b), which we construe today, governs successive 
petitions filed by state prisoners. The section makes no ref-
those decisions is that, on balancing the competing interests implicated by 
affording federal collateral relief to persons in state custody, federal courts 
should not exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over a certain category of 
constitutional claims, whether or not those claims are meritorious. 
Whether one characterizes those decisions as carving out an "exception" to 
federal habeas jurisdiction, as the dissent apparently prefers to do, post, at 
3, n. 1, or as concerning the scope of that jurisdiction, the result is the 
same, and was reached under a framework of analysis that weighed the 
pertinent interests. Similarly, in Fay v. Noia, JusTICE BRENNAN's opin-
ion for the Court expressly made a "practical appraisal of the state inter-
est" in a system of procedural forfeitures, weighing that interest against 
the other interests implicated by federal collateral review of procedurally 
defaulted claims. 372 U. S., at 433. Of course, that the Court in Noia 
adopted an expansive reading of the scope of the writ does not undercut 
the fact that it did so by balancing competing interests. 
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erence to the "ends ofjustice," 9 and provides that the federal 
courts "need not" entertain "subsequent applications" from 
state prisoners "unless the application alleges and is predi-
cated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on" the 
prior application "and unless the court . . . is satisfied that 
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately 
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the 
writ." 10 In construing this language, we are cognizant that 
Congress adopted the section in light of the need-often rec-
ognized by this Court-to weigh the interests of the individ-
ual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the 
State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal 
laws. 11 
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the 1966 amendments, including those to§ 2244(b), to 
introduce "a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas 
corpus proceedings." S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., p. 2 (1966) (Senate Report). Congress was concerned 
• In § 2244(a), which now governs successive petitions filed by federal 
prisoners, Congress preserved virtually intact the language of fonner 
§ 2244, including the reference to the "ends of justice." 
'"28 U.S. C. §2244(b) provides: 
"When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual 
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person incus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court 
of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from 
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a 
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person 
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or 
judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated 
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier 
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied 
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld 
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." 
11 Sensitivity to the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review 
is implicit in the statutory command that the federal courts "shall . . . dis-
pose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243 (empha-
sis added). 
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with the "steadily increasing" burden imposed on the federal 
courts by "applications by State prisoners for writs of habeas 
corpus." 12 /d., at 1; see H. R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1966) (House Report). In many instances, 
the "heavy burden" created by these applications was "un-
necessary'' because state prisoners "have been filing applica-
tions either containing allegations identical to those asserted 
in a previous application that has been denied, or predicated 
upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed 
the preceding application." Senate Report, at 2; see House 
Report, at 5. The Senate Report explicitly states that the 
"purpose" of the amendments was to "alleviate the unnec-
essary burden" by adding "to section 2244 . . . provisions for 
a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." Sen-
ate Report, at 2; see House Report, at 8. The House also 
expressed concern that the increasing number of habeas 
applications from State prisoners "greatly interfered with the 
procedures and processes of the State courts by delaying, in 
many cases, the proper enforcement of their judgments." 
ld., at 5. 
Based on the 1966 amendments and their legislative his-
tory, petitioner argues that federal courts no longer must 
12 The Senate Report incorporates a letter from Senior Circuit Judge 
Orie L. Phillips to Senator Joseph D. Tydings that states, 
"The need for this legislation ... is demonstrated by the fact that the num-
ber of applications for writs of habeas corpus in Federal courts by State 
court prisoners increased from 134 in 1941 to 814 in 1957. In fiscal 1963, 
1,692 applications for the writ were filed by State court prisoners; in fiscal 
1964, 3,248 such applications were filed; in fiscal 1965, 4,845 such applica-
tions were filed; and in the first 9 months of fiscal 1966, 3, 773 such applica-
tions were filed , yet less than 5 percent of such applications were decided 
by the Federal district courts in favor of the applicant for the writ. More 
than 95 percent were held to be without merit." Senate Report, at 4, 5-6. 
Since 1966, the burden imposed by applications for federal habeas corpus 
filed by state prisoners has continued to increase. In 1966, a total of 5,339 
such applications was filed. In 1985, 8,534 applications were filed. An-
nual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. 
Courts. 
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consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a successive 
petition. We reject this argument. It is clear that Con-
gress intended for district courts, as the general rule, to give 
preclusive effect to a judgment denying on the merits a ha-
beas petition alleging grounds identical in substance to those 
raised in the subsequent petition. But the permissive lan-
guage of§ 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain 
successive petitions under some circumstances. Moreover, 
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Courts, which was amended in 1976, 
contains similar permissive language, providing that the dis-
trict court "may'' dismiss a "second or successive petition" 
that does not "allege new or different grounds for relief." 
Consistent with Congress' intent in enacting § 2244(b), how-
ever, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28 
U. S. C., p. 358, states that federal courts should entertain 
successive petitions only in "rare instances." 13 Unless those 
"rare instances" are to be identified by whim or caprice, dis-
trict judges must be given guidance for determining when to 
exercise the limited discretion granted them by § 2244(b). 
Accordingly, as a means of identifying the rare case in which 
federal courts should exercise their discretion to hear a suc-
cessive petition, we continue to rely on the reference in 
Sanders to the "ends of justice." Our task is to provide a 
definition of the "ends of justice" that will accommodate Con-
gress' intent to give finality to federal habeas judgments with 
the historic function of habeas corpus to provide relief from 
unjust incarceration. 
B 
We now consider the limited circumstances under which 
the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitutional 
claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the 
13 The Advisory Committee Note relies on the "ends of justice" inquiry 
described in Sanders to identify the unusual case where a successive peti-
tion should be heard. 
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countervailing interests served by according finality to the 
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the 
prisoner. 
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second 
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration. 
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed 
the prisoner's claims in several proceedjngs provided by the 
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have 
determined that his trial was free of constitutional error, a 
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtain-
ing his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for 
which he was incarcerated. That interest does not extend, 
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As 
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an 
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the cer-
tainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention 
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was 
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be re-
stored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harlan J., dissenting). 
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a 
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the in-
terests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes. 
Finality serves many of those important interests. A vail-
ability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defend-
ants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring 
crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to 
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity be-
lieve there is a possibility that they will escape punishment 
through repetitive collateral attacks. 14 See Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly, finality serves the 
""Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the law 
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punish-
ment."' Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Fi-
nality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963). 
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State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes be-
cause "[r ]ehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant 
realize that 'he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in 
need of rehabilitation."' I d., at 128, n. 32 (quoting Bator, 
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963)). See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Finality also serves the State's legiti-
mate punitive interests. When a prisoner is freed on a suc-
cessive petition, often many years after his crime, the State 
may be unable successfully to retry him.'5 Peyton v. Rowe, 
391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968). This result is unacceptable if the 
State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the 
"erosion of memory'' and "dispersion of witnesses" that occur 
with the passage of time that invariably attends collateral at-
tack.16 Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 127-128; Friendly, Is Inno-
15 Where the prisoner secures his release on a successive petition, the 
delay between the crime and retrial following issuance of the writ often will 
be substantial. The delay in this case is illustrative. Respondent com-
mitted the robbery and murder in 1970, and was convicted in 1972. Direct 
appeal was completed in 1973. The intervening years have been largely 
consumed by federal habeas corpus review, with the past four years de-
voted to relitigation of respondent's claim that admission in evidence of his 
statements to Lee violated the Sixth Amendment. 
16 Finality serves other goals important to our system of criminal justice 
and to federalism. Unlimited availability of federal collateral attack bur-
dens our criminal justice system as successive petitions divert the "time of 
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers" from the important task of trying crimi-
nal cases. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Crim-
inal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148-149 (1970). See Engle v. 
Isaac, supra, at 127. Federal habeas review creates friction between our 
state and federal courts, as state judges-however able and thorough-
know that their judgments may be set aside by a single federal judge, 
years after it was entered and affirmed on direct appeal. See id., at 128. 
Moreover, under our federal system the States "possess primary authority 
for defining and enforcing the criminal law," and "hold the initial respon-
sibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state 
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offend-
ers and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Ibid., 
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cence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970). 
In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the 
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal ha-
beas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the 
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such peti-
tions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional 
claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. This 
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a dec-
ade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As 
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that 
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of inno-
cence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in 
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this 
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress that 
successive federal habeas review should be granted only in 
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of 
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite 
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence 
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner 
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued 
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully 
admitted. 17 
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., con-
curring). Despite those costs, Congress has continued to afford federal 
habeas relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society 
for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to 
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., 
at 491-492, n. 31. 
17 As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable 
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not, 
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been uncon-
stitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner 
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including 
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any 
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c 
Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that 
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of 
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's 
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of 
respondent's guilt "was nearly overwhelming." 742 F. 2d, at 
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not 
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The 
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this successive petition under§ 2244(b) on the ground 
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim 
was final. 18 
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly ex-
cluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts 
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote 
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite 
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt 
or innocence. 
18 The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes our opinion in several re-
spects. The dissent states that the plurality "implies that federal habeas 
review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his 
first federal petition a properly preserved [constitutional claim]." Post, at 
2 (emphasis added). This case involves, and our opinion describes, only 
the standard applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas corpus re-
lief. Thus, the first six pages of the dissent have little, if any, relevance to 
this case. There, JUSTICE BRENNAN merely reiterates at length his views 
as to the general scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, with no ex-
planation of how those views apply when a district judge is required to con-
sider a habeas corpus petition presenting an issue decided on the merits in 
a previous federal habeas proceeding. 
The dissent further mistakenly asserts that we reject Sanders' holding 
that the question whether successive review is proper should be decided 
under a "'sound discretion' standard." Post, at 1. As we have stated, 
the permissive language of§ 2244(b) of course gives the federal courts dis-
cretion to decide whether to entertain a successive petition, and since 
Sanders those courts have relied on the phrase "ends of justice" as a gen-
eral standard for identifying cases in which successive review may be ap-
propriate. What Sanders left open-and the dissent today ignores-is the 
critical question of what considerations should inform a court's decision 
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IV 
Even if the Court of Appeals had correctly decided to en-
tertain this successive habeas petition, we conclude that it 
erred in holding that respondent was entitled to relief under 
United States v. Henry. As the District Court observed, 
Henry left open the question whether the Sixth Amendment 
forbids admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a 
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but 
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. 19 
Our review of the line of cases beginning with M assiah v. 
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), shows that this question 
must, as the District Court properly decided, be answered 
negatively. 
A 
The decision in M assiah had its roots in two concurring 
opinions written in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959). 
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.--,-- (1985). Follow-
ing his indictment for first-degree murder, the defendant in 
Spano retained a lawyer and surrendered to the authorities. 
Before leaving the defendant in police custody, counsel cau-
tioned him not to respond to interrogation. The prosecutor 
and police questioned the defendant, persisting in the face of 
his repeated refusal to answer and his repeated request to 
speak with his lawyer. The lengthy interrogation involved 
improper police tactics, and the defendant ultimately con-
fessed. Following a trial at which his confession was admit-
that successive review of an issue previously decided will serve the "ends 
of justice." While the dissent today purports to provide some substance to 
the Sanders standard by requiring a "good justification" for relitigation of a 
claim previously decided, its standard provides no real guidance to federal 
courts confronted with successive claims for habeas corpus relief. As to 
the need for a standard, see pp. 7-8, supra. 
19 In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - (1985), we again reserved this 
question, declining to reach the situation where the informant acts simply 
as a "'listening post'" without "participat[ing] in active conversation and 
prompt[ing] particular replies." !d., at-. 
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ted in evidence, the defendant was convicted and sentenced 
to death. I d., at 316-320. Agreeing with the Court that the 
confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted in 
evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurring 
Justices also took the position that the defendant's right to 
counsel was violated by the secret interrogation. I d., at 325 
(Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart observed, an 
indicted person has the right to assistance of counsel 
throughout the proceedings against him. Id., at 327. The 
defendant was denied that right when he was subjected to an 
"all-night inquisition," during which police ignored his re-
peated requests for his lawyer. Ibid. 
The Court in M assiah adopted the reasoning of the concur-
ring opinions in Spano and held that, once a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has attached, he is denied that 
right when federal agents "deliberately elicit" incriminating 
statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. 377 
U. S., at 206. The Court adopted this test, rather than one 
that turned simply on whether the statements were obtained 
in an "interrogation," to protect accused persons from "'indi-
rect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those con-
ducted in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seri-
ously imposed upon ... because he did not even know that he 
was under interrogation by a government agent.'" Ibid., 
quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d 62, 72-73 (1962) 
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the Court made clear 
that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative 
techniques that were equivalent to interrogation, and that it 
so viewed the technique in issue in M assiah. 20 
20 The defendant in Massiah made the incriminating statements in a con-
versation with one of his confederates, who had secretly agreed to permit 
government agents to listen to the conversation over a radio transmitter. 
The agents instructed the confederate to "engage Massiah in conversation 
relating to the alleged crimes." United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d, at 72 
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). 
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In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah 
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse inform-
ant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of 
M assiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in 
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and 
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] re-
vealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This 
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably 
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used 
his position to secure incriminating information from [the de-
fendant] when counsel was not present." I d., at 270. Al-
though the informant had not questioned the defendant, the 
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant 
in order to "elicit" incriminating information. I d., at 273; 
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts, 
like the facts of M assiah, amounted to "'indirect and surrep-
titious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. I d., at 273. 
Earlier this term, we applied the M assiah standard in a 
case involving incriminating statements made under circum-
stances substantially similar to the facts of M assiah itself. 
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. -- (1985), the defendant 
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accom-
plice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During 
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to 
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the 
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant 
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the 
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. I d., at 
The Court concluded that these investigatory tech-
niques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pend-
ing charges. 21 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, be-
cause of the relationship between the defendant and the 
21 The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]n-
criminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth 
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course, 
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Molton, supra, at -. 
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. informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active 
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit" 
incriminating statements from the defendant. I d., at --, 
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversa-
tion was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Ibid. 
(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL, 
J., concurring)). 
As our recent recent examination of this Sixth Amendment 
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the 
M assiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investiga-
tory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police in-
terrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated 
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains in-
criminating statements from the accused after the right to 
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at --, citing United 
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a 
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply 
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrange-
ment or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to 
the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that 
the police and their informant took some action, beyond 
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit in-
criminating remarks. 
B 
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in con-
cluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under 
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from 
any disagreement with the District Court over appropriate 
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from 
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that open 
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mis-
take, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the 
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correct-
ness expressly required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Patton v. 
Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 
(1981). 
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The state court found that Officer Cullen had instructed 
Lee only to listen to respondent for the purpose of determin-
ing the identities of the other participants in the robbery and 
murder. The police already had solid evidence of respond-
ent's participation. 22 The court further found that Lee fol-
lowed those instructions, that he "at no time asked any ques-
tions" of respondent concerning the pending charges, and 
that he "only listened" to respondent's "spontaneous" and 
"unsolicited" statements. The only remark made by Lee 
that has any support in this record was his comment that re-
spondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes 
"didn't sound too good." Without holding that any of the 
state court's findings were not entitled to the presumption of 
correctness under§ 2254(d), 23 the Court of Appeals focused on 
that one remark and gave a description of Lee's interaction 
with respondent that is completely at odds with the facts 
found by the trial court. In the Court of Appeals' view, 
"Subtly and slowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal inter-
course with [respondent] served to exacerbate [respondent's] 
already troubled state ofmind." 24 742 F. 2d, at 745. After 
thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring 
other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incrimi-
nating statements. Ibid. This conclusion conflicts with the 
22 Eyewitnesses had identified respondent as the man they saw fleeing 
from the garage with an armful of money. 
28 The majority did not respond to Judge Van Graafeiland's criticism that 
the court could not "dispense with the presumption that the State court's 
factual findings are correct without an adequate explanation as to why the 
findings are not fairly supported by the record." 742 F. 2d, at 749 (cita-
tions omitted). 
2' Curiously, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that respondent 
was placed in a cell that overlooked the scene of his crimes. Id., at 745. 
For all the record shows, however, that fact was sheer coincidence. Nor 
do we perceive any reason to require police to isolate one charged with 
crime so that he cannot view the scene, whatever it may be, from his cell 
window. 
84-147~PINION 
24 KUHLMANN v. WILSON 
decision of every other state and federal judge who reviewed 
this record, and is clear error in light of the provisions and 
intent of§ 2254(d). 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
lfp/ss 03/20/86 Rid~r A, p. 25, 84-1479 Wilson 
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We read the reference in Sanders to "ends of justice" to 
be consistent with the view that in limited circumstances 
a successive petition may be entertained. In considering 
when it may be appropriate to exercise this discretion, we 
bear in mind that the basic function of federal habeas 
corpus is to provide relief from unjust incarceration. 
lfp/ss 03/20/86 Rider A, p. 13, 84-1479 Wilson 
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Thus, this peremptory holding would leave District Court 
judges without guidance in disposing of successive 
application for a writ of habeas corpus. See Brown v. 
Allen, 344 u.s. 443, 497 (1953) {opinion of Frankfurter, 
J.) • 
lfp/ss 03/24/86 WILM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Anne DATE: March 24, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-1479 Khulman v. Wilson 
Your second draft of March 22, incorporating my 
suggestions and 
respect. It was 
other changes, is excellent in every 
a joy to read both in terms of good 
writing and sound reasoning. 
I am even beg inning to have a glimmer of hope 
that our main argument may attract a Court. But do not 
set your heart on this - at least since our reasoning will 
be new to most of the Justices. 
Apart from usual editing, I make the following 
comments and suggestions: 
1. With respect to 
deterring crime, we might show 
society's interest in 
in a footnote how few 
persons who commit felonies are ever arrested, charged and 
brought to trial, and how many of those are convicted and 
sentenced. Ask the Library to examine FBI reports that 
contain these statistics, and give you the latest report 
on these statistics. Professional criminals - and even 
the more casual type of criminals who support their drug 
2. 
' t 
addictions by robbing and mugging - count on the fact that 
our system of justice is so slow and cumbersome that even 
when arrested and charged, final convictions and 
sentencing occur in a relatively small number of cases. 
It is probable that Congress, in enacting 
§2254 (b) had these facts in mind. When I served on the 
Crime Commission appointed by President Johnson in the 
late 60s, our studies revealed that a high percentage of 
the crimes are never solved and that the public also is 
reluctant to cooperate with police because of retaliation. 
I would not make a "big deal" of this, Anne, as you have 
more important things to do. I merely suggest that we see 
what the FBI turns up after you have made clear what we 
want. 
2. Perhaps the most critical paragraph in Part 
III of the opinion is the concluding one that purports to 
state the basic standard. I have suggested substantial 
revision in this paragraph. My objective was to make it 
consistent with the clear intention of Congress, and also 
with the statement that successive review should "rarely" 
be permit ted. Take a close look at my revisions. No 
doubt you can improve the language, 
very clear that successive review 
but we should make 
is "rarely" to be 
3. 
allowed, and that there is a heavy burden on the defendant 
who claims this right. 
3. I think you Part IV is excellent, and have 
made few suggested changes. It does seems to be longer 
than necessary. If you find opportunities to omit a few 
lines here and there without weakening our argument, 
please do so. But I am happy with the present draft. 
* * * 
As we agreed in our talk on Saturday, it is 
highly desirable to move your superb opinion in this 
important case forward as rapidly as possible, consistent 
with the care we customarily take. I suppose Cabell 
will be the editor. Please say to him that I have 
reviewed your draft twice, and think that basically the 
language needs little or no editing except where Cabell 
may think a statement is erroneous or could be framed more 
artfully. I do not wish to retreat from our basic 
positions in both of the major sections of the opinion. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 06/11/86 Rider A, p. (Khulmann) 
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The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes the 
plurality opinion in several respects. The dissent states 
that the plurality "implies that federal habeas review is 
not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who 
alleges in his first federal petition a properly preserved 
[constitutional claim] . . " (italics added). This case 
involves, and our opinion addresses, only the standard 
applicable to successive petitions. The dissent further 
states that we "reject[] Sanders' 'sound discretion' 
standard." Of course, a district court must exercise 
discretion when deciding whether to entertain a successive 
petition. Sanders left open, however, the critical 
question as to the standard or considerations to be 
2. 
applied in determining whether "the ends of justice" would 
be served by considering such a petition. Moreover, 
Sanders affords no guidance as to the meaning - in the 
context of a successive petition - of the "ends of 
justice". 
Having criticized the plurality for not leaving 
district courts free merely to exercise "sound 
discretion", the dissent goes on to propose its own 
newstandard: district courts should refuse to entertain 
"abusive, meritless petitions", but should entertain 
successive petitions advancing a "potentially meritorious 
claim" for which the petitioner offers a "good 
justification" for seeking relitigation. Post, at 9. 
This twin-standard, in practical effect, would provide no 
guidance to district courts. If a petition is "meritless" 
3. 
there is a duty to deny habeas relief. Many claims, 
however, will fall into the dissent's category of the 
"potentially meritorious". It is as to those claims that 
the standard governing successive petitions will make a 
critical difference. 
In this case, for example, respondent's federal 
habeas petition relied on Henry, a case decided 
subsequently to the first denial of habeas relief. On its 
face, respondent's claim properly required the District 
Court to review the record to determine whether in fact 
there was a "successive petition" that presented the same 
question previously resolved both by the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals. In sum, although recognizing 
that Sanders had provided no guidance, the dissent's 
proposed standard would leave district courts and courts 
4. 
of appeals with meaningless "guidance" from this Court. 
This is evident from the fact that the dissent would 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. That court 
simply ignored the relevant finding of facts that had been 
made by the state trial court, and accepted by both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals on the first 
federal habeas petition. In addition, the Court of 
Appeals concluded, wholly without reasoning or analysis, 
that the "ends of justice" required its decision. See 
infra, this opinion, at p. __ , et seq. 
' 
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84-1479, Kuhlmann v. Wilson ~ ~ 
New footnote to come at the end of Part III: ~ ~ 
The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes our op~n ~ ~ 
several respects. The dissent states that the plurali t / ) 
"implies that federal habeas review is not available as a 
matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his first 
federal petition a properly preserved [constitutional 
claim]." Post, at 2 (emphasis added). This case 
involves, and our opinion considers, only the standard 
applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas 
corpus relief. The dissent further mistakenly asserts 
that the plurality "rejects Sanders' 'sound discretion' 
standard." Post, at 1. As we have stated, the permissive 
language of §2244 (b) of course gives the federal courts 
discretion to decide whether to entertain a successive 
petition, and since Sanders those courts have relied on 
the phrase "ends of justice" as a general standard for 
identifying cases in which successive review may be 
appropriate. What Sanders left open--and the dissent 
today ignores--is the critical question of what 
considerations should inform a court's decision that 
2. 
successive review of an issue previously decided will 
serve the "ends of justice." 
Having criticized our decision for refusing to leave 
district judges at large to exercise "sound discretion," 
the dissent goes on to propose its own new standard: 
district courts should refuse to entertain "abusive, 
meritless petitions," but should entertain successive 
petitions advancing a "potentially meritorious claim" for 
which the petitioner offers a "good justification" for 
seeking relitigation. Post, at 9. The dissent's dual 
standard would in fact provide no guidance to district 
courts. Informing district courts to decline successive 
review of mer i tless petitions is superfluous. District 
courts already are under a duty to deny relief on 
meritless claims. More fundamentally, that standard 
ignores the threshold issue presented in this case, that 
requires us to identify the circumstances under which 
federal courts, once they properly have decided that a 
petition is successive, should go on to consider the 
merits. 
Moreover, many claims will fall into the dissent's 
category of the "potentially meritorious." It is with 
respect to those claims that the standard adopted by the 
3. 
Court today (ante, at _____ ) provides guidance - not 
found in Sanders - as to the meaning in this context of 
"ends of justice." In contrast, in this case where the 
identical issue had been resolved in the first federal 
habeas corpus case, the dissent would affirm the Court of 
Appeals' decision approving repetitive review, giving no 
reason other than its conclusory statement that "the ends 
of justice" so required. (Anne: Am I right that this was 
the only basis?) What the dissent proposes would leave 
courts in second federal habeas corpus cases - in which 
serious issues of successive review of identical questions 
were raised free to make standardless judgments. 
Sanders and habeas corpus rule 9(b) would be meaningless. 
page 10, new footnote 9 (this is the note that you already 
approved) : 
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our cases 
deciding that federal habeas review ordinarily does not 
extend to procedurally defaulted claims plainly concern 
the "general scope of the writ." Post, at 3. The point 
of those decisions is that, on balancing the competing 
interests implicated by affording federal collateral 
4. 
relief to persons in state custody, federal courts should 
not exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over a certain 
category of constitutional claims, whether or not those 
claims are meritorious. Whether one characterizes those 
decisions as carving out an "exception" to federal habeas 
jurisdiction, as the dissent apparently prefers to do, 
post, at 3, n. 1, or as concerning the scope of that 
jurisdiction, the result is the same, and was reached 
under a framework of analysis that weighed the pertinent 
interests. Similarly, in ~ v. Noia, JUSTICE BRENNAN'S 
opinion for the Court expressly made a "practical 
appraisal of the state interest" in a system of procedural 
forfeitures, weighing that interest against the other 
interests implicated by federal collateral review of 
procedurally defaulted claims. 372 u.s., at 433. Of 
course, that the Court in Noia adopted an expansive 
reading of the scope of the writ does not undercut the 
fact that it did so by balancing competing interests. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to define the circumstances under 
which federal courts should entertain a state prisoner's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus that raises claims rejected on a 
prior petition for the same relief. 
I 
In the early morning of July 4, 1970, respondent and two 
confederates robbed the Star Taxicab Garage in the Bronx, 
New York, and fatally shot the night dispatcher. Shortly 
before, employees of the garage had observed respondent, a 
former employee there, on the premises conversing with two 
other men. They also witnessed respondent fleeing after the 
robbery, carrying loose money in his arms. After eluding 
the police for four days, respondent turned himself in. Re-
spondent admitted that he had been present when the crimes 
took place, claimed that he had witnessed the robbery, gave 
the police a description of the robbers, but denied knowing 
them. Respondent also denied any involvement in the rob-
bery or murder, claiming that he had fled because he was 
afraid of being blamed for the crimes. 
After his arraignment, respondent was confined in the 
Bronx House of Detention, where he was placed in a cell with 
a prisoner named Benny Lee. Unknown to respondent, Lee 
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had agreed to act as a police informant. Respondent made 
incriminating statements that Lee reported to the police. 
Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress the statements 
on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right 
to counsel. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on 
the suppression motion, which revealed that the statements 
were made under the following circumstances. 
Before respondent arrived in the jail, Lee had entered into 
an arrangement with Detective Cullen, according to which 
Lee agreed to listen to respondent's conversations and report 
his remarks to Cullen. Since the police had positive evi-
dence of respondent's participation, the purpose of placing 
Lee in the cell was to determine the identities of respondent's 
confederates. Cullen instructed Lee not to ask respondent 
any questions, but simply to "keep his ears open" for the 
names of the other perpetrators. Respondent first spoke to 
Lee about the crimes after he looked out the cellblock win-
dow at the Star Taxicab Garage, where the crimes had oc-
curred. Respondent said, "someone's messing with me," 
and began talking to Lee about the robbery, narrating the 
same story that he had given the police at the time of his ar-
rest. Lee advised respondent that this explanation "didn't 
sound too good," 1 but respondent did not alter his story. 
Over the next few days, however, respondent changed de-
tails of his original account. Respondent then received a 
visit from his brother, who mentioned that members of his 
family were upset because they believed that respondent had 
murdered the dispatcher. After the visit, respondent again 
described the crimes to Lee. Respondent now admitted that 
'At the suppression hearing, Lee testified that, after hearing respond-
ent's initial version of his participation in the crimes, "I think I remember 
telling him that. the story wasn't-it didn't sound too good. Things didn't 
look too good for him." At trial, Lee testified to a somewhat different ver-
sion of his remark: "Well, I said, look, you better come up with a better 
story than that because that one doesn't sound too cool to me, that's what I 
said." 
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he and two other men, whom he never identified, had 
planned and carried out the robbery, and had murdered the 
dispatcher. Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements 
and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surrep-
titiously while sharing the cell with respondent. 
After hearing the testimony of Cullen and Lee, 2 the trial 
court found that Cullen had instructed Lee "to ask no ques-
tions of [respondent] about the crime but merely to listen as 
to what [respondent] might say in his presence." The court 
determined that Lee obeyed these instructions, that he "at 
no time asked any questions with respect to the crime," and 
that he "only listened to [respondent] and made notes regard-
ing what [respondent] had to say." The trial court also 
found that respondent's statements to Lee were "spontane-
ous" and "unsolicited." Under state precedent, a defend-
ant's volunteered statements to a police agent were admissi-
ble in evidence because the police were not required to 
prevent talkative defendants from making incriminating 
statements. See People v. Kaye, 25 N. Y. 2d 139, 145, 250 
N. E. 2d 329, 332 (1969). The trial court accordingly denied 
the suppression motion. 
The jury convicted respondent of common law murder and 
felonious possession of a weapon. On May 18, 1972, the trial 
court sentenced him to a term of twenty years to life on the 
murder count and to a concurrent term of up to seven years 
on the weapons count. The Appellate Division affirmed 
without opinion, People v. Wilson, 41 App. Div. 2d 903, 343 
N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1973), and the New York Court of Appeals 
denied respondent leave to appeal. 
On December 7, 1973, respondent filed a petition for fed-
eral habeas corpus relief. Respondent argued, among other 
things, that his statements to Lee were obtained pursuant to 
police investigative methods that violated his constitutional 
rights. After considering Massiah v. United States, 377 
2 Respondent did not testify at the suppression 'hearing. 
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U. S. 201 (1964), the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York denied the writ on January 7, 1977. The record 
demonstrated "no interrogation whatsoever" by Lee and 
"only_ spontaneous statements" from respondent. In the 
District Court's view, these "fact[s] preclude[d] any Sixth 
Amendment violation." 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d 1185 (1978). 
The court noted that a defendant is denied his Sixth Amend-
ment rights when the trial court admits in evidence incrimi-
nating statements that state agents "'had deliberately elic-
ited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of 
counsel."' Id., at 1189, quoting Massiah v. United States, 
supra, at 206. Relying in part on Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U. S. 387 (1977), the court reasoned that the "deliberately 
elicited" test of Massiah requires something more than in-
criminating statements uttered in the absence of counsel. 
On the facts found by the state trial court, which were enti-
tled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2254(d), the court held that respondent had not established 
a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 3 We denied a pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari. Wilson v. Henderson, 442 
u. s. 945 (1979). 
Following this Court's decision in United States v. Henry, 
447 U. S. 264 (1980), which applied the Massiah test to sup-
press statements made to a paid jailhouse informant, re-
spondent decided to relitigate his Sixth Amendment claim. 
On September 11, 1981, he filed in state trial court a motion 
3 The Court of Appeals observed that suppression of respondent's state-
ments would serve "no useful purpose" because Cullen had not engaged in 
"reprehensible police behavior," but rather had made a "conscious effort" 
to protect respondent's "constitutional rights [under Massiah] while pursu-
ing a crucial homicide investigation." Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d, at 
1191. 
Judge Oakes dissented, arguing that the "deliberately elicited" test of 
Massiah proscribed admission in evidence of an accused's statements ob-
tained pursuant to the investigatory tactics used here. !d., at 1194-1195. 
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to vacate his conviction. The judge denied the motion, on 
the grounds that Henry was factually distinguishable from 
this case, 4 and that under state precedent Henry was not to 
be given retroactive effect, see People v. Pepper, 53 N. Y.2d 
213, 423 N. E. 2d 366 (1981). The Appellate Division denied 
respondent leave to appeal. 
On July 6, 1982, respondent returned to the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York on a habeas petition, 
again arguing that admission in evidence of his incriminating 
statements to Lee violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 
Respondent contended that the decision in Henry constituted 
a new rule of law that should be applied retroactively to this 
case. The District Court found it unnecessary to consider 
retroactivity because it decided that Henry did not under-
mine the Court of Appeals' prior disposition of respondent's 
Sixth Amendment claim. Noting that Henry reserved the 
question whether the Constitution forbade admission in evi-
dence of an accused's statements to an informant who made 
"no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged," see United States v. Henry, supra, at 271, n. 9, 
the District Court believed that this case presented that open 
question and that the question must be answered negatively. 
The District Court noted that the trial court's findings were 
presumptively correct, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), and were 
fully supported by the record. The court concluded that 
these findings were "fatal" to respondent's claim under 
Henry since they showed that Lee made no "affirmative ef-
fort" of any kind "to elicit information" from respondent. 
A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Ap-
peals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741 (1984). 
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact 
4 The trial judge found that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 
(1980), was distinguishable because the jailhouse informant in that case 
was paid for reporting the defendant's statements to the police. 
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that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to 
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned 
that the circumstances under which respondent made his in-
criminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from 
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry 
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new 
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to 
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejected 
respondent's claim had erred, and remanded the case to the 
District Court with instructions to order respondent's release 
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5 
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. -- (1985), to consider 
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition 
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the 
facts of this case. We now reverse. 
II 
A 
In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respond- . 
ent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals 
relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), 
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow 
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "succes-
5 Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority con-
ceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed con-
duct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now un-
constitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the 
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respond-
ent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual deter-
minations. !d., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregard-
ing "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings 
are not fairly supported by the record." !d. , at 749. In Judge Van 
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' jus-
tify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has 
gone on before. " Ib-id. (citations omitted). 
' 
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sive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in 
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28 
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the 
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ. 
I d., at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that 
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern 
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sand-
ers framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the 
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas 
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner 
on a prior petition if "the ends of justice would not be served 
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." I d., 
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on 
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sand-
ers provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof 
that a prisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of jus-
tice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously 
decided against him. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates 
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals sheds no light on this important 
threshold question, merely declaring that the "ends of jus-
tice" required successive federal habeas corpus review. 
Failure to provide clear guidance leaves district judges "at 
large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus," 
creating the danger that they will engage in "the exercise not 
6 The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct 
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised 
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U. S., at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circum-
stances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of 
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the 
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition 
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, 
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks," 
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that 
the prisoner has abused the writ. Id., at 17-19. 
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of law but of arbitrariness." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 
497 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). This Court therefore 
must now define the considerations that should govern fed-
eral courts' disposition of successive petitions for habeas 
corpus. 
B 
Since 1867, when Congress first authorized the federal 
courts to issue the writ on behalf of persons in state custody, 7 
this Court often has been called upon to interpret the lan-
guage of the statutes defining the scope of that jurisdiction. 
It may be helpful to review our cases construing these fre-
quently used statutes before we answer the specific question 
before us today. 
Until the early years of this century, the substantive scope 
of the federal habeas corpus statutes was defined by refer-
ence to the scope of the writ at common law, where the 
courts' inquiry on habeas was limited exclusively "to the ju-
risdiction of the sentencing tribunal." Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 475 (1976). See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 
72, 78, 79 (1977); see also Oaks, Legal History in the High 
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 458-468 
(1966). Thus, the finality of the judgment of a committing 
court of competent jurisdiction was accorded absolute respect 
on habeas review. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 
U. S. 218, 254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During 
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on 
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of 
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed 
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright 
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
7 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, the first grant of 
jurisdiction to the federal courts, included authority to issue the writ of ha-
beas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of federal prisoners. In 1867, Con-
gress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the 
custody of the States. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 474- 475 (1976). 
84-1479-0PINION 
KUHLMANN v. WILSON 9 
475-478. The Court initially accomplished this expansion 
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing 
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79. 
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction 
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims 
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and 
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 
104-105 (1942). 
Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope 
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed 
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes a state prison-
er's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the pris-
oner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amend-
ment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Al-
though the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of 
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded 
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth 
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially cre-
ated exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by 
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational sys-
tem of criminal justice." Id., at 494. Among those costs 
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a crimi-
nal trial "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence," 
and exclusion of reliable evidence that was "often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant." ld., at 490. Our decision to except this cate-
gory of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger 
that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an in-
nocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." . 
ld., at 491-492 n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who 
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was 
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[d] no 
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bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." I d., at 492, 
n. 31. 
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the 
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes 
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas 
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by eq-
uitable principles." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963), 
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573 
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the 
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to 
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in 
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at 
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as 
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus 
were offended when a conviction was issued by a court that 
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intoler-
able convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional 
commands. But the Court never has defined the scope of 
the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure 
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of 
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its 
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests 
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitu-
tional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the 
state courts. E. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129 
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia, 
supra, at 426-434. 
III 
A 
The Court in Sanders drew the phrase "ends of justice" di-
rectly from the version of 28 U. S. C. § 2244 in effect in 1963. 
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both 
federal and state prisoners, stated in relevant part that no 
federal judge "shall be required to entertain an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a 
-
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person . . . , if it appears that the legality of such detention 
has been determined" by a federal court "on a prior applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no 
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and 
the judge . . . is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be 
served by such inquiry." 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1964) (empha-
sis added). Accordingly, in describing guidelines for succes-
sive petitions, Sanders did little more than quote the lan-
guage of the then-pertinent statute, leaving for another day 
the task of giving that language substantive content. 
In 1966, Congress carefully reviewed the habeas corpus 
statutes and amended their provisions, including § 2244. 
Section 2244(b), which we construe today, governs successive 
petitions filed by state prisoners. The section makes no ref-
erence to the "ends ofjustice," 8 and provides that the federal 
courts "need not" entertain "subsequent applications" from 
state prisoners "unless the application alleges and is predi-
cated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on" the 
prior application "and unless the court . . . is satisfied that 
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately 
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the 
writ." 9 In construing this language, we are cognizant that 
8 In § 2244(a), which now governs successive petitions filed by federal 
prisoners, Congress preserved virtually intact the language of former 
§ 2244, including the reference to the "ends of justice." 
9 28 U.S. C. §2244(b) provides: 
"When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual 
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person incus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court 
of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from 
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a 
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person 
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or 
judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicat.ed 
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier 
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied 
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld 
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." 
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Congress adopted the section in light of the need-often rec-
ognized by this Court-to weigh the interests of the individ-
ual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the 
State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal 
laws. 10 
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the 1966 amendments, including those to § 2244(b), to 
introduce "a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas 
corpus proceedings." S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., p. 2 (1966) (Senate Report). Congress was concerned 
with the "steadily increasing" burden imposed on the federal 
courts by "applications by State prisoners for writs of habeas 
corpus." 11 Id., at 1; see H. R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1966) (House Report). In many instances, 
the "heavy burden" created by these applications was "un-
necessary" because state prisoners "have been filing applica-
tions either containing allegations identical to those asserted 
in a previous application that has been denied, or predicated 
•• Sensitivity to the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review 
is implicit in the statutory command that the federal courts "shall . .. dis-
pose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243 (empha-
sis added). . 
11 The Senate Report incorporates a letter from Senior Circuit Judge 
Orie L. Phillips to Senator Joseph D. Tydings that states, 
"The need for this legislation . .. is demonstrated by the fact that the num-
ber of applications for writs of habeas corpus in Federal courts by State 
court prisoners increased from 134 in 1941 to 814 in 1957. In fiscal 1963, 
1,692 applications for the writ were filed by State court prisoners; in fiscal 
1964, 3,248 such applications were filed; in fiscal 1965, 4,845 such applica-
tions were filed; and in the first 9 months of fiscal1966, 3, 773 such applica-
tions were filed, yet less than 5 percent of such applications were decided 
by the Federal district courts in favor of the applicant for the writ. More 
than 95 percent were held to be without merit." Senate Report, at 4, 5-6. 
Since 1966, the burden imposed by applications for federal habeas corpus 
filed by state prisoners has continued to increase. In 1966, a total of 5,339 
such applications was filed. In 1985, 8,534 applications were filed. An-
nual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. 
Courts. 
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upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed 
the preceding application." Senate Report, at 2; see House 
Report, at 5. The Senate Report explicitly states that the 
"purpose" of the amendments was to "alleviate the unnec-
essary burden" by adding "to.section 2244 ... provisions for 
a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." Sen-
ate Report, at 2; see House Report, at 8. The House also 
expressed concern that the increasing number of habeas 
applications from State prisoners "greatly interfered with the 
procedures and processes of the State courts by delaying, in 
many cases, the proper enforcement of their judgments." 
Id., at 5. 
Based on the 1966 amendments and their legislative his-
tory, petitioner argues that federal courts no longer must 
consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a successive 
petition. We reject this argument. It is clear that Con-
gress intended .for district courts, as the general rule, to give 
preclusive effect to a judgment denying on the merits a ha-
beas petition alleging grounds identical in substance to those 
raised in the subsequent petition. But the permissive lan-
guage of§ 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain 
successive petitions under some circumstances. Moreover, 
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Courts, which was amended in 1976, 
contains similar permissive language, providing that the dis-
trict court "may" dismiss a "second or successive petition" 
that does not "allege new or different grounds for relief." 
Consistent with Congress' intent in enacting § 2244(b), how-
ever, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28 
U. S. C., p. 358, states that federal courts should entertain 
successive petitions only in "rare instances." 12 Unless those 
"rare instances" are to be identified by whim or caprice, dis-
trict judges must be given guidance for determining when to 
12 The Advisory Committee Note relies on the "ends of justice" inquiry 
described in Sanders to identify the unusual case where a successive peti-
tion should be heard. 
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exercise the limited discretion granted them by § 2244(b). 
Accordingly, as a means of identifying the rare case in which 
federal courts should exercise their discretion to hear a suc-
cessive petition, we continue to rely on the reference in 
Sanders to the "ends of justice." Our task is to provide a 
definition of the "ends of justice" that will accommodate Con-
gress' intent to give finality to federal habeas judgments with 
the historic function of habeas corpus to provide relief from 
unjust incarceration. 
B 
We now consider the limited circumstances under which 
the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitutional 
claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the 
countervailing interests served by according finality to the 
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the 
prisoner. 
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second 
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration. 
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed 
the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the 
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have 
determined that his trial was free of constitutional error, a 
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtain-
ing his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for 
which he was incarcerated. That interest does not extend, 
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As 
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an 
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the cer-
tainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention 
will ul~imately be focused not on whether a conviction was 
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be re-
stored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harlan J., dissenting). 
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a 
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the in-
terests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes. 
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Finality serves many of those important interests. A vail-
ability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defend-
ants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring 
- crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to 
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity be-
lieve there is a possibility that they will escape punishment 
through repetitive collateral attacks. 13 See Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly, finality serves the 
State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes be-
cause "[r ]ehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant 
realize that 'he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in 
need of rehabilitation."' Id., at 128, n. 32 (quoting Bator, 
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963)). See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Finality also serves the State's legiti-
mate punitive interests. When a prisoner is freed on a suc-
cessive petition, often many years after his crime, the State 
may be unable successfully to retry him. 14 Peyton v. Rowe, 
391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968). This result is unacceptable if the 
State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the 
"erosion of memory" and "dispersion of witnesses" that occur 
with the passage of time that invariably attends collateral at-
13 "Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the law 
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punish-
ment."' Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Fi-
nality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963). 
14 Where the prisoner secures his release on a successive petition, the 
delay between the crime and retrial following issuance of the writ often will 
be substantial. The delay in this case is illustrative. Respondent com-
mitted the robbery and murder in 1970, and was convicted in 1972. Direct 
appeal was completed in 1973. The intervening years have been largely 
consumed by federal habeas corpus review, with the past four years de-
voted to relitigation of respondent's claim that admission in evidence of his 
statements to Lee violated the Sixth Amendment. 
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tack. 15 Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 127-128; Friendly, Is Inno-
cence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970). 
In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the 
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal ha-
beas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the 
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such peti-
tions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional 
claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. This 
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a dec-
ade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As 
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that 
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of inno-
cence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in 
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this 
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress that 
15 Finality serves other goals important to our system of criminal justice 
and to federalism. Unlimited availability of federal collateral attack bur-
dens our criminal justice system as successive petitions divert the "time of 
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers" from the important task of trying crimi-
nal cases. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Crim-
inal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148-149 (1970). See Engle v. 
Isaac, supra, at 127. Federal habeas review creates friction between our 
state and federal courts, as state judges-however able and thorough-
know that their judgments may be set aside by a single federal judge, 
years after it was entered and affirmed on direct appeal. See id., at 128. 
Moreover, under our federal system the States "possess primary authority 
for defining and enforcing the criminal law," and "hold the initial respon-
sibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state 
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offend-
ers and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Ibid., 
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., con-
curring). Despite those costs, we have continued to afford federal habeas 
relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society for an 
additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to suffer an 
unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 491-492, 
n. 31. 
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successive federal habeas review should be granted only in 
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of 
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite 
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence 
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner 
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued 
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully 
admitted. 16 
c 
Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that 
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of 
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's 
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of 
respondent's guilt "was nearly overwhelming." 742 F. 2d, at 
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not 
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The 
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this successive petition under§ 2244(b) on the ground 
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim 
was final. 
IV 
Even if the Court of Appeals had correctly decided to en-
tertain this successive habeas petition, we conclude that it 
erred in holding that respondent was entitled to relief under 
United States v. Henry. As the District Court observed, 
16 As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable 
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not, 
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been uncon-
stitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner 
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including 
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any 
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly ex-
cluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts 
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote 
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite 
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt 
or innocence. 
84-1479--0PINION 
18 KUHLMANN v. WILSON 
Henry left open the question whether the Sixth Amendment 
forbids admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a 
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but 
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. 17 
Our review of the line of cases beginning with M assiah v. 
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), shows that this question 
must, as the District Court properly decided, be answered 
negatively. 
A 
The decision in M assiah had its roots in two concurring 
opinions written in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959). 
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.--,-- (1985). Follow-
ing his indictment for first-degree murder, the defendant in 
Spano retained a lawyer and surrendered to the authorities. 
Before leaving the defendant in police custody, counsel cau-
tioned him not to respond to interrogation. The prosecutor 
and police questioned the defendant, persisting in the face of 
his repeated refusal to answer and his repeated request to 
speak with his lawyer. The lengthy interrogation involved 
improper police tactics, and the defendant ultimately con-
fessed. Following a trial at which his confession was admit-
ted in evidence, the defendant was convicted and sentenced 
to death. I d., at 316-320. Agreeing with the Court that the 
confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted in 
evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurring 
Justices also took the position that the defendant's right to 
counsel was violated by the secret interrogation. I d., at 325 
(Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart observed, an 
indicted person has the right to assistance of counsel 
throughout the proceedings against him. /d., at 327. The 
defendant was denied that right when he was subjected to an 
17 ln Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - (1985), we again reserved this 
question, declining to reach the situation where the informant acts simply 
as a "'listening post'" without "participat[ing] in active conversation and 
prompt[ing] particular replies." !d., at-. 
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"all-night inquisition," during which police ignored his re-
peated requests for his lawyer. Ibid. 
The Court in M assiah adopted the reasoning of the concur-
ring opinions in Spano and held that, once a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has attached, he is denied that 
right when federal agents "deliberately elicit" incriminating 
statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. 377 
U. S., at 206. The Court adopted this test, rather than one 
that turned simply on whether the statements were obtained 
in an "interrogation," to protect accused persons from "'indi-
rect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those con-
ducted in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seri-
ously imposed upon ... because he did not even know that he 
was under interrogation by a government agent.'" Ibid., 
quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d 62, 72-73 (1962) 
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the Court made clear 
that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative 
techniques that were equivalent to interrogation, and that it 
so viewed the technique in issue in M assiah. 18 
In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah 
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse inform-
ant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of 
M assiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in 
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and 
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] re-
vealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This 
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably 
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used 
his position to secure incriminating information from [the de-
fendant] when counsel was not present." Id., at 270. Al-
18 The defendant in M assiah made the incriminating statements in a con-
versation with one of his confederates, who had secretly agreed to permit 
government agents to listen to the conversation over a radio transmitter. 
The agents instructed the confederate to "engage Massiah in conversation 
relating to the alleged crimes." United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d, at 72 
(Hays, J. , dissenting in part). 
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though the informant had not questioned the defendant, the 
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant 
in order to "elicit" incriminating information. I d., at 273; 
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts, 
like the facts of M assiah, amounted to "'indirect and surrep-
titious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. I d., at 273. 
Earlier this term, we applied the M assiah standard in a 
case involving incriminating statements made under circum-
stances substantially similar to the facts of Massiah itself. 
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. -- (1985), the defendant 
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accom-
plice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During 
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to 
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the 
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant 
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the 
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. I d., at 
The Court concluded that these investigatory tech-
niques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pend-
ing charges. 19 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, be-
cause of the relationship between the defendant and the 
informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active 
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit" 
incriminating statements from the defendant. I d., at --, 
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversa-
tion was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation."' Ibid. 
(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL, 
J., concurring)). 
As our recent recent examination of this Sixth Amendment 
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the 
Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investiga-
tory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police in-
19 The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]n-
criminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth 
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course, 
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Molton, supra, at-. 
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terrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated 
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains in-
criminating statements from the accused after the right to 
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at --, citing United 
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a 
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply 
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrange-
ment or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to 
the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that 
the police and their informant took some action, beyond 
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit in-
criminating remarks. 
B 
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in con-
cluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under 
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from 
any disagreement with the District Court over appropriate 
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from 
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that open 
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mis-
take, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the 
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correct.-
ness expressly required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Patton v. 
Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. M ata, 449 U. S. 539 
(1981). 
The state court found that Officer Cullen had instructed 
Lee only to listen to respondent for the purpose of determin-
ing the identities of the other participants in the robbery and 
murder. The police already had solid evidence of respond-
ent's participation. 20 The court further found that Lee fol-
lowed those instructions, that he "at no time asked any ques-
tions" of respondent concerning the pending charges, and 
that he "only listened" to respondent's "spontaneous" and 
20 Eyewitnesses had identified respondent as the man they saw fleeing 
from the garage with an armful of money. 
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"unsolicited" statements. The only remark made by Lee 
that has any support in this record was his comment that re-
spondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes 
"didn't sound too good." Without holding that any of the 
state court's findings were not entitled to the presumption of 
correctness under§ 2254(d)/1 the Court of Appeals focused on 
that one remark and gave a description of Lee's interaction 
with respondent that is completely at odds with the facts 
found by the trial court. In the Court of Appeals' view, 
"Subtly and slowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal inter-
course with [respondent] served to exacerbate [respondent's] 
already troubled state ofmind." 22 742 F. 2d, at 745. After 
thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring 
other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incrimi-
nating statements. Ibid. This conclusion conflicts with the 
decision of every other state and federal judge who reviewed 
this record, and is clear error in light of the provisions and 
intent of§ 2254(d). 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
21 The majority did not respond to Judge Van Graafeiland's criticism that 
the court could not "dispense with the presumption that the State court's 
factual findings are correct without an adequate explanation as to why the 
findings are not fairly supported by the record. " 742 F . 2d, at 749 (cita-
tions omitted). 
22 Curiously, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that respondent 
was placed in a cell that overlooked the scene of his crimes. /d., at 745. 
For all the record shows, however, that fact was sheer coincidence. Nor 
do we perceive any reason to require police to isolate one charged with 
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TICE O'CONNOR join. 
This case requires us to define the circumstances under 
which federal courts should entertain a state prisoner's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus that raises claims rejected on a 
prior petition for the same relief. 
I 
In the early morning of July 4, 1970, respondent and two 
confederates robbed the Star Taxicab Garage in the Bronx, 
New York, and fatally shot the night dispatcher. Shortly 
before, employees of the garage had observed respondent, a 
former employee there, on the premises conversing with two 
other men. They also witnessed respondent fleeing after the 
robbery, carrying loose money in his arms. After eluding 
the police for four days, respondent turned himself in. Re-
spondent admitted that he had been present when the crimes 
took place, claimed that he had witnessed the robbery, gave 
the police a description of the robbers, but denied knowing 
them. Respondent also denied any involvement in the rob-
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bery or murder, claiming that he had fled because he was 
afraid of being blamed for the crimes. 
After his arraignment, respondent was confined in the 
Bronx House of Detention, where he was placed in a cell with 
a prisoner named Benny Lee. Unknown to respondent, Lee 
had agreed to act as a police informant. Respondent made 
incriminating statements that Lee reported to the police. 
Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress the statements 
on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right 
to counsel. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on 
the suppression motion, which revealed that the statements 
were made under the following circumstances. 
Before respondent arrived in the jail, Lee had entered into 
an arrangement with Detective Cullen, according to which 
Lee agreed to listen to respondent's conversations and report 
his remarks to Cullen. Since the police had positive evi-
dence of respondent's participation, the purpose of placing 
Lee in the cell was to determine the identities of respondent's 
confederates. Cullen instructed Lee not to ask respondent 
any questions, but simply to "keep his ears open" for the 
names of the other perpetrators. Respondent first spoke to 
Lee about the crimes after he looked out the cellblock win-
dow at the Star Taxicab Garage, where the crimes had oc-
curred. Respondent said, "someone's messing with me," 
and began talking to Lee about the robbery, narrating the 
same story that he had given the police at the time of his ar-
rest. Lee advised respondent that this explanation "didn't 
sound too good,"' but respondent did not alter his story. 
Over the next few days, however, respondent changed de-
'At the suppression hearing, Lee testified that, after hearing respond-
ent's initial version of his participation in the crimes, "I think I remember 
telling him that the story wasn't-it didn't sound too good. Things didn't 
look too good for him." At trial, Lee testified to a somewhat different ver-
sion of his remark: "Well, I said, look, you better come up with a better 
story than that because that one doesn't sound too cool to me, that's what I 
said." 
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tails of his original account. Respondent then received a 
visit from his brother, who mentioned that members of his 
family were upset because they believed that respondent had 
murdered the dispatcher. After the visit, respondent again 
described the crimes to Lee. Respondent now admitted that 
he and two other men, whom he never identified, had 
planned and carried out the robbery, and had murdered the 
dispatcher. Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements 
and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surrep-
titiously while sharing the cell with respondent. 
After hearing the testimony of Cullen and Lee, 2 the trial 
court found that Cullen had instructed Lee "to ask no ques-
tions of [respondent] about the crime but merely to listen as 
to what [respondent] might say in his presence." The court 
determined that Lee obeyed these instructions, that he "at 
no time asked any questions with respect to the crime," and 
that he "only listened to [respondent] and made notes regard-
ing what [respondent] had to say." The trial court also 
found that respondent's statements to Lee were "spontane-
ous" and "unsolicited." Under state precedent, a defend-
ant's volunteered statements to a police agent were admissi-
ble in evidence because the police were not required to 
prevent talkative defendants from making incriminating 
statements. See People v. Kaye, 25 N. Y. 2d 139, 145, 250 
N. E. 2d 329, 332 (1969). The trial court accordingly denied 
the suppression motion. 
The jury convicted respondent of common law murder and 
felonious possession of a weapon. On May 18, 1972, the trial 
court sentenced him to a term of twenty years to life on the 
murder count and to a concurrent term of up to seven years 
on the weapons count. The Appellate Division affirmed 
without opinion, People v. Wilson, 41 App. Div. 2d 903, 343 
N. Y. S. 2d 563 (1973), and the New York Court of Appeals 
denied respondent leave to appeal. 
2 Respondent did not testify at the suppression hearing. 
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On December 7, 1973, respondent filed a petition for fed-
eral habeas corpus relief. Respondent argued, among other 
things, that his statements to Lee were obtained pursuant to 
police investigative methods that violated his constitutional 
rights. After considering Massiah v. United States, 377 
U. S. 201 (1964), the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York denied the writ on January 7, 1977. The record 
demonstrated "no in~errogation whatsoever" by Lee and 
"only spontaneous . statements" from respondent. In the 
District Court's view, these "fact[s] preclude[d] any Si~th 
Amendment violation." 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F. 2d 1185 (1978). 
The court noted that a defendant is denied his Sixth Amend-
ment rights when the trial court admits in evidence incrimi-
nating statements that state agents " 'had deliberately elic-
ited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of 
counsel."' Id., at 1189, quoting Massiah v. United States, 
supra, at 206. Relying in part on Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U. S. 387 (1977), the court reasoned that the "deliberately 
elicited" test of M assiah requires something more than in-
criminating statements uttered in the absence of counsel. 
On the facts found by the state trial court, which were enti-
tled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2254(d), the court held that respondent had not established 
a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 3 We denied a pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari. Wilson v. Henderson, 442 
u. s. 945 (1979). 
3 The Court of Appeals observed that suppression of respondent's state-
ments would serve "no useful purpose" because Cullen had not engaged in 
"reprehensible police behavior," but rather had made a "conscious effort" 
to protect respondent's "constitutional rights [under Massiah] while pursu-
ing a crucial homicide investigation." Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F . 2d, at 
1191. 
Judge Oakes dissented, arguing that the "deliberately elicited" test of 
Massiah proscribed admission in evidence of an accused's statements ob-
tained pursuant to the investigatory tactics used here. I d., at 1194-1195. 
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Following this Court's decision in United States v. Henry, 
447 U. S. 264 (1980), which applied the Massiah test to sup-
press statements made to a paid jailhouse informant, re-
spondent decided to relitigate his Sixth Amendment claim. 
On September 11, 1981, he filed in state trial court a motion 
to vacate his conviction. The judge denied the motion, on 
the grounds that Henry was factually distinguishable from 
this case, 4 and that under state precedent Henry was not to 
be given retroactive effect, see People v. Pepper, 53 N. Y.2d 
213, 423 N. E. 2d 366 (1981). The Appellate Division denied 
respondent leave to appeal. 
On July 6, 1982, respondent returned to the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York on a habeas petition, 
again arguing that admission in evidence of his incriminating 
statements to Lee violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 
Respondent contended that the decision in Henry constituted 
a new rule of law that should be applied retroactively to this 
case. The District Court found it unnecessary to consider 
retroactivity because it decided that Henry did not under-
mine the Court of Appeals' prior disposition of respondent's 
Sixth Amendment claim. Noting that Henry reserved the 
question whether the Constitution forbade admission in evi-
dence of an accused's statements to an informant who made 
"no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged," see United States v. Henry, supra, at 271, n. 9, 
the District Court believed that this case presented that open 
question and that the question must be answered negatively. 
The District Court noted that the trial court's findings were 
presumptively correct, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), and were 
fully supported by the record. The court concluded that 
these findings were "fatal" to respondent's claim under 
Henry since they showed that Lee made no "affirmative ef-
fort" of any kind "to elicit information" from respondent. 
'The trial judge found that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 
(1980), was distinguishable because the jailhouse informant in that case 
was paid for reporting the defendant's statements to the police. 
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A different, and again divided, panel of the Court of Ap-
peals reversed. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741 (1984). 
As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this petition, notwithstanding the fact 
that the prior panel had determined the merits adversely to 
respondent. 742 F. 2d, at 743. The court then reasoned 
that the circumstances under which respondent made his in-
criminating statements to Lee were indistinguishable from 
the facts of Henry. Finally, the court decided that Henry 
was fully applicable here because it did not announce a new 
constitutional rule, but merely applied settled principles to 
new facts. 742 F. 2d, at 746-747. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that all of the judges who had considered and rejected 
respondent's claim had erred, and remanded the case to the 
District Court with instructions to order respondent's release 
from prison unless the State elected to retry him. 5 
We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. -- (1985), to consider 
the Court of Appeals' decision that the "ends of justice" re-
quired consideration of this successive habeas corpus petition 
and that court's application of our decision in Henry to the 
facts of this case. We now reverse. 
II 
A 
In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respond-
ent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals 
5 Judge Van Graafeiland, dissenting, observed that the majority con-
ceded that there had been no change in the law that had "transformed con-
duct that we formerly held to be constitutional into conduct that is now un-
constitutional." 742 F. 2d, at 749. Thus, the majority's rejection of the 
conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respond-
ent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual deter-
minations. !d., at 748. The dissent criticized the majority for disregard-
ing "the presumption that the State court's factual findings are correct, 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d), without an adequate explanation as to why the findings 
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relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), 
which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow 
when presented with habeas petitions claimed to be "succes-
sive" or an "abuse of the writ." 6 The narrow question in 
Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28 
U. S. C. § 2255 was properly denied without a hearing on the 
ground that the motion constituted an abuse of the writ. 
I d., at 4-6. The Court undertook not only to answer that 
question, but also to explore the standard that should govern 
district courts' consideration of successive petitions. Sand-
ers framed the inquiry in terms of the requirements of the 
"ends of justice," advising district courts to dismiss habeas 
petitions raising claims determined adversely to the prisoner 
on a prior petition if "the ends of justice would not be served 
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." I d., 
at 15, 16-17. While making clear that the burden of proof on 
this issue rests on the prisoner, id., at 17, the Court in Sand-
ers provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof 
that a prisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of jus-
tice" would be served by relitigation of the claims previously 
decided against him. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case demonstrates 
the need for this Court to provide that guidance. The opin-
are not fairly supported by the record." !d. , at 749. In Judge Van 
Graafeiland's view, "[a] boilerplate statement that the 'ends of justice' jus-
tify reconsideration on the merits does not warrant rejection of all that has 
gone on before." Ibid. (citations omitted). 
6 The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct 
meanings. A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to those raised 
and rejected on the merits on a prior petition. See Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U. S. , at 15-17. Our decision today concerns the circum-
stances under which district courts properly should entertain the merits of 
such a petition. The concept of "abuse of the writ" is founded on the 
equitable nature of habeas corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition 
raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, 
or engages in other conduct that "disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks," 
the federal court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that 
the prisoner has abused the writ. Id., at 17-19. 
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ion of the Court of Appeals sheds no light on this important 
threshold question, merely declaring that the "ends of jus-
tice" required successive federal habeas corpus review. 
Failure to provide clear guidance leaves district judges "at 
large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas corpus," 
creating the danger that they will engage in "the exercise not 
of law but of arbitrariness." Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 
497 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). This Court therefore 
must now define the considerations that should govern fed-
eral courts' disposition of successive petitions for habeas 
corpus. 
B 
Since 1867, when Congress. first authorized the federal 
courts to issue the writ on behalf of persons in state custody, 7 
this Court often has been called upon to interpret the lan-
guage of the statutes defining the scope of that jurisdiction. 
It may be helpful to review our cases construing these fre-
quently used statutes before we answer the specific question 
before us today. 
Until the early years of this century, the substantive scope 
of the federal habeas corpus statutes was defined by refer-
ence to the scope of the writ at common law, where the 
courts' inquiry on habeas was limited exclusively "to the ju-
risdiction of the sentencing tribunal." Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 475 (1976). See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 
72, 78, 79 (1977); see also Oaks, Legal History in the High 
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 458-468 
(1966). Thus, the finality of the judgment of a committing 
court of competent jurisdiction was accorded absolute respect 
on habeas review. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 
'The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, the first grant of 
jurisdiction to the federal courts, included authority to issue the writ of ha-
beas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of federal prisoners. In 1867, Con-
gress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the 
custody of the States. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 474-475 (1976). 
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U. S. 218, 254-256 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). During 
this century, the Court gradually expanded the grounds on 
which habeas corpus relief was available, authorizing use of 
the writ to challenge convictions where the prisoner claimed 
a violation of certain constitutional rights. See Wainwright 
v. Sykes, supra, at 79-80; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
475-478. The Court initially accomplished this expansion 
while purporting to adhere to the inquiry into the sentencing 
court's jurisdiction. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 79. 
Ultimately, the Court abandoned the concept of jurisdiction 
and acknowledged that habeas "review is available for claims 
of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and 
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his 
rights."' Ibid., quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 
104-105 (1942). 
Our decisions have not been limited to expanding the scope 
of the writ. Significantly, in Stone v. Powell, we removed 
from the reach of the federal ·habeas statutes a state prison-
er's claim "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the pris-
oner could show that the State had failed to provide him "an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his Fourth Amend-
ment claim. 428 U. S., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Al-
though the Court previously had accepted jurisdiction of 
search and seizure claims, id., at 480, we were persuaded 
that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth 
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially cre-
ated exclusionary rule on federal habeas was "outweighed by 
the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational sys-
tem of criminal justice." Id., at 494. Among those costs 
were diversion of the attention of the participants at a crimi-
nal trial "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence," 
and exclusion of reliable evidence that was "often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant.'! I d., at 490. Our decision to except this cate-
gory of claims from habeas corpus review created no danger 
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that we were denying a "safeguard against compelling an in-
nocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." 
!d., at 491-492 n. 31. Rather, a convicted defendant who 
pressed a search and seizure claim on collateral attack was 
"usually asking society to redetermine an issue that ha[d] no 
bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." I d., at 492, 
n. 31. 
In decisions of the past two or three decades construing the 
reach of the habeas statutes, whether reading those statutes 
broadly or narrowly, the Court has reaffirmed that "habeas 
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by eq-
uitable principles." Fay· v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963), 
citing United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573 
(1953) (dissenting opinion). See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
478, n. 11. The Court uniformly has been guided by the 
proposition that the writ should be available to afford relief to 
those "persons whom society has grievously wronged" in 
light of modern concepts of justice. Fay v. Noia, supra, at 
440-441. See Stone v. Powell, supra, at 492, n. 31. Just as 
notions of justice prevailing at the inception of habeas corpus 
were offended when a conviction was issued by a court that 
lacked jurisdiction, so the modern conscience found intoler-
able convictions obtained in violation of certain constitutional 
commands. But the Court never has defined the scope of 
the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure 
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of 
constitutional error. Rather, the Court has performed its 
statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests 
implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitu-
tional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the 
state courts. E. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129 
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 489-495; Fay v. Noia, 
supra, at 426-434.8 
8 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our cases deciding that federal I 
habeas review ordinarily does not extend to procedurally defaulted claims 
plainly concern the "general scope of the writ." · Post, at 3. The point of 
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The Court in Sanders drew the phrase "ends of justice" di-
rectly from the version of 28 U. S. C. § 2244 in effect in 1963. 
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both 
federal and state prisoners, stated in relevant part that no 
federal judge "shall be required to entertain an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a· 
person . . . , if it appears that the legality of such detention 
has been determined" by a federal court "on a prior applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no 
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and 
the judge . . . is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be 
served by such inquiry." 28 U. S. C. § 2244 (1964) (empha-
sis added). Accordingly, in describing guidelines for succes-
sive petitions, Sanders did little more than quote the lan-
guage of the then-pertinent statute, leaving for another day 
the task of giving that language substantive content. 
In 1966, Congress carefully reviewed the habeas corpus 
statutes and amended their provisions, including § 2244. 
Section 2244(b), which we construe today, governs successive 
petitions filed by state _prisoners. The section makes no ref-
those decisions is that, on balancing the competing interests implicated by 
affording federal collateral relief to persons in state custody, federal courts 
should not exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over a certain category of 
constitutional claims, whether or not those claims are meritorious. 
Whether one characterizes those decisions as carving out an "exception" to 
federal habeas jurisdiction, as the dissent apparently prefers to do, post, at 
3, n. 1, or as concerning the scope of that jurisdiction, the result is the 
same, and was reached under a framework of analysis that weighed the 
pertinent interests. Similarly, in Fay v. Noia, JUSTICE BRENNAN's opin-
ion for the Court expressly made a "practical appraisal of the state inter-
est" in a system of procedural forfeitures, weighing that interest against 
the other interests implicated by federal collateral review of procedurally 
defaulted claims. 372 U. S., at 433. Of course, that the Court in Noia 
adopted an expansive reading of the scope of the writ does not undercut 
the fact that it did so by balancing competing interests. 
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erence to the "ends of justice," 9 and provides that the federal 
courts "need not" entertain "subsequent applications" from 
state prisoners "unless the application alleges and is predi-
cated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated· on" the 
prior application "and unless the court . . . is satisfied that 
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately 
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the 
writ." '0 In construing this language, we are cognizant that 
Congress adopted the section in light of the need-often rec-
ognized by this Court-to weigh the interests of the individ-
ual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the 
State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal 
laws. 11 
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the 1966 amendments, including those to § 2244(b), to 
introduce "a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas 
corpus proceedings." S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Gong., 2d 
Sess., p. 2 (1966) (Senate Report). Congress was concerned 
9 In § 2244(a), which now governs successive petitions filed by federal 
prisoners, Congress preserved virtually intact the language of former 
§ 2244, including the reference to the "ends of justice." 
10 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) provides: 
"When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual 
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person incus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court 
of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from 
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a 
subs_equent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person 
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or 
judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated 
on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier 
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied 
that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld 
the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." 
11 Sensitivity to the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review 
is implicit in the statutory command that the federal courts "shall ... dis-
pose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243 (empha-
sis added). 
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with the "steadily increasing" burden imposed on the federal 
courts by "applications by State prisoners for writs of habeas 
corpus." 12 Id., at 1; see H. R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1966) (House Report). In many instances, 
the "heavy burden" created by these applications was "un-
necessary" because state prisoners "have been filing applica-
tions either containing allegations identical to those asserted 
in a previous application that has been denied, or predicated 
upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed 
the preceding application." Senate Report, at 2; see House 
Report, at 5. The Senate Report explicitly states that the 
"purpose" of the amendments was to "alleviate the unnec-
essary burden" by adding "to section 2244 . . . provisions for 
a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." Sen-
ate Report, at 2; see House Report, at 8. The House also 
expressed concern that the increasing number of habeas 
applications from State prisoners "greatly interfered with the 
procedures and processes of the State courts by delaying, in 
many cases, the proper enforcement of their judgments." 
!d., at 5. 
Based on the 1966 amendments and their legislative his-
tory, petitioner argues that federal courts no longer must 
'
2 The Senate Report incorporates a letter from Senior Circuit Judge 
Orie L. Phillips to Senator Joseph D. Tydings that states, 
"The need for this legislation ... is demonstrated by the fact that the num-
ber of applications for writs of habeas corpus in Federal courts by State 
court prisoners increased from 134 in 1941 to 814 in 1957. In fiscal 1963, 
1,692 applications for the writ were filed by State court prisoners; in fiscal 
1964, 3,248 such applications were filed; in fiscal 1965, 4,845 such applica-
tions were filed; and in the first 9 months of fiscal 1966, 3, 773 such applica-
tions were filed, yet less than 5 percent of such applications were decided 
by the Federal district courts in favor of the applicant for the writ. More 
than 95 percent were held to be without merit." Senate Report, at 4, 5-6. 
Since 1966, the burden imposed by applications for federal habeas corpus 
filed by state prisoners has continued to increase. In 1966, a total of 5,339 
such applications was filed. In 1985, 8,534 applications were filed. An-
nual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. 
Courts. 
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consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a successive 
petition. We reject this argument. It is clear that Con-
gress intended for district courts, as the general rule, to give 
preclusive effect to a judgment denying on the merits a ha-
beas petition alleging grounds identical in substance to those 
raised in the subsequent petition. But the permissive lan-
guage of§ 2244(b) gives federal courts discretion to entertain 
successive petitions under some circumstances. Moreover, 
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States Di~trict Courts, which was amended in 1976, 
contains similar permissive language, providing that the dis-
trict court "may" dismiss a "second or successive petition" 
that does not "allege new or different grounds for relief." 
Consistent with Congress' intent in enacting § 2244(b), how-
ever, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28 
U. S. C., p. 358, states that federal courts should entertain 
successive petitions only in "rare instances." 13 Unless those 
"rare instances" are to be identified by whim or caprice, dis-
trict judges must be given guidance for determining when to 
exercise the limited discretion granted them by § 2244(b). 
Accordingly, as a means of identifying the rare case in which 
federal courts should exercise their discretion to hear a suc-
cessive petition, we continue to rely on the reference in 
Sanders to the "ends of justice." Our task is to provide a 
definition of the "ends of justice" that will accommodate Con-
gress' intent to give finality to federal habeas judgments with 
the historic function of habeas corpus to provide relief from 
unjust incarceration. 
B 
We now consider the limited circumstances under which 
the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitutional 
claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the 
13 The Advisory Committee Note relies on the "ends of justice" inquiry 
described in Sanders to identify the unusual case where a successive peti-
tion should be heard. 
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countervailing interests served by according finality to the 
prior judgment. We turn first to the interests of the 
prisoner. 
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second 
chance to test the fundamental justice of his incarceration. 
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed 
the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the 
State and on his first petition for federal habeas corpus have 
determined that his trial was free of constitutional error, a 
prisoner retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtain-
ing his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for 
which he was incarcerated. That interest does not extend, 
however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or plain. As 
Justice Harlan observed, the guilty prisoner himself has "an 
interest in insuring that there will at some point be the cer-
tainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention 
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was 
free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be re-
stored to a useful place in the community." Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U. S., at 24-25 (Harhm J., dissenting). · 
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a 
forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the in-
terests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes. 
Finality serves many of those important interests. A vail-
ability of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defend-
ants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in deterring 
crime, since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to 
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity be-
lieve there is a possibility that they will escape punishment 
through repetitive collateral attacks. 14 See Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U. S., at 127-128, n. 32. Similarly~ finality serves the 
" "Deterrence depends upon the expectation that 'one violating the Jaw 
will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punish-
ment.'" Engle v. Isaac , 456 U.S., at 127-128, n. 32, quoting Bator, Fi-
nality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963). 
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State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes be-
cause "[r ]ehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant 
realize that 'he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in 
need of rehabilitation.'" I d., at 128, n. 32 (quoting Bator, 
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1963)). See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Finality also serves the State's legiti-
mate punitive interests. When a prisoner is freed on a suc-
cessive petition, often many years after his crime, the State 
may be unable successfully to retry him.'5 Peyton v. Rowe, 
391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968). This result is unacceptable if the 
State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the 
"erosion of memory" and "dispersion of witnesses" that occur 
with the passage of time that invariably attends collateral at-
tack.'6 Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 127-128; Friendly, Is Inno-
15 Where the prisoner secures his release on a successive petition, the 
delay between the crime and retrial following issuance of the writ often will 
be substantial. The delay in this case is illustrative. Respondent com-
mitted the robbery and murder in 1970, and was convicted in 1972. Direct 
appeal was completed in 1973. The intervening years have been largely 
consumed by federal habeas corpus review, with the past four years de-
voted to relitigation of respondent's claim that admission in evidence of his 
statements to Lee violated the Sixth Amendment. 
16 Finality serves other goals important to our system of criminal justice 
and to federalism. Unlimited availability of federal collateral attack bur-
dens our criminal justice system as successive petitions divert the "time of 
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers" from the important task of trying crimi-
nal cases. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Crim-
inal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 148-149 (1970). See Engle v. 
Isaac, supra, at 127. Federal habeas review creates friction between our 
state and federal courts, as state judges-however able and thorough-
know that their judgments may be set aside by a single federal judge, 
years after it was entered and affirmed on direct appeal. See id., at 128. 
Moreover, under our federal system the States "possess primary authority 
for defining and enforcing the criminal law," and "hold the initial respon-
sibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state 
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offend-
ers and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Ibid., 
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cence Irrelevant?, Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 146-148 (1970). 
In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the 
interests implicated by successive petitions for federal ha-
beas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the 
"ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such peti-
tions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional 
claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. This 
standard was proposed by Judge Friendly more than a dec-
ade ago as a prerequisite for federal habeas review generally. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on 
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). As 
Judge Friendly persuasively argued then, a requirement that 
the prisoner come forward with a colorable showing of inno-
cence identifies those habeas petitioners who are justified in 
again seeking relief from their incarceration. We adopt this 
standard now to effectuate the clear intent of Congress that 
successive federal habeas review should be granted only in 
rare cases, but that it should be available when the ends of 
justice so require. The prisoner may make the requisite 
showing by establishing that under the probative evidence 
he has a colorable claim of factual innocence. The prisoner 
must make his evidentiary showing even though-as argued 
in this case-the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully 
admitted. 17 
citing Schneckloth v. Busta monte, 412 U. S., at 263-265 (POWELL, J., con-
CUITing). Despite those costs, Congress has continued to afford federal I 
habeas relief in appropriate cases, "recognizing the need in a free society 
for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent [person] to 
suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., 
at 491-492, n. 31. 
17 As Judge Friendly explained, a prisoner does not make a colorable 
showing of innocence "by showing that he might not, or even would not, 
have been convicted in the absence of evidence claimed to have been uncon-
stitutionally obtained." Friendly, supra, at 160. Rather, the prisoner 
must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including 
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any 
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c 
Applying the foregoing standard in this case, we hold that 
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the "ends of 
justice" would be served by consideration of respondent's 
successive petition. The court conceded that the evidence of 
respondent's guilt "was nearly overwhelming." 742 F. 2d, at 
742. The constitutional claim argued by respondent does not 
itself raise any question as to his guilt or innocence. The 
District Court and the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this successive petition under§ 2244(b) on the ground 
that the prior judgment denying relief on this identical claim 
was final. 18 
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly ex-
cluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts 
would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." Ibid. (footnote 
omitted). Thus, the question whether the prisoner can make the requisite 
showing must be determined by reference to all probative evidence of guilt 
or innocence. 
18 The dissenting opinion mischaracterizes our opinion in several re-
spects. The dissent states that the plurality "implies that federal habeas 
review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his 
first federal petition a ·properly preserved [constitutional claim]." Post, at 
2 (emphasis added). This case involves, and our opinion describes, only 
the standard applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas corpus re-
lief. The dissent further mistakenly asserts that we reject Sanders' hold-
ing that the question whether successive review is proper should be de-
cided under a "'sound discretion' standard." Post, at 1. As we have 
stated, the permissive language of § 2244(b) of course gives the federal 
courts discretion to decide whether to entertain a successive petition, and 
since Sanders those courts have relied on the phrase "ends of justice" as a 
general standard for identifying cases in which successive review may be 
appropriate. What Sanders left open-and the dissent today ignores-is 
the critical question of what considerations should inform a court's decision 
that successive review of an issue previously decided will serve the "ends 
of justice." While the dissent today purports to-provide some substance to 
the Sanders standard by requiring a "good justification" for relitigation of a 
claim previously decided, its standard provides no real guidance to federal 
courts confronted with successive claims for habeas corpus relief. As to 
the need for a standard, see pp. 7-8, supra. 
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IV 
Even if the Court of Appeals had correctly decided to en-
tertain this successive habeas petition, we conclude that it 
erred in holding that respondent was entitled to relief under 
United States v. Henry. As the District Court observed, 
Henry left open the question whether the Sixth Amendment 
forbids admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a 
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but 
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. 19 
Our review of the line of cases beginning with M assiah v. 
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), shows that this question 
must, as the District Court properly decided, be answered 
negatively. 
A 
The decision in Massiah had its roots in two concurring 
opinions written in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959). 
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. --,-- (1985). Follow-
ing his indictment for first-degree murder, the defendant in 
Spano retained a lawyer and surrendered to the authorities. 
Before leaving the defendant in police custody, counsel cau-
tioned him not to respond to interrogation. The prosecutor 
and police questioned the defendant, persisting in the face of 
his repeated refusal to answer and his repeated request to 
speak with his lawyer. The lengthy interrogation involved 
improper police tactics, and the defendant ultimately con-
fessed. Following a trial at which his confession was admit-
ted in evidence, the defendant was convicted and sentenced 
to death. I d., at 316-320. Agreeing with the Court that the 
confession was involuntary and thus improperly admitted in 
evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurring 
Justices also took the position that the defendant's right to 
•• In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - (1985), we again reserved this 
question, declining to reach the situation where the informant acts simply 
as a "'listening post'" without "participat[ing] in active conversation and 
prompt[ing] particular replies." I d. , at -. 
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counsel was violated by the secret interrogation. I d., at 325 
(Douglas, J., concurring). As Justice Stewart observed, an 
indicted person has the right to assistance of counsel 
throughout the proceedings against him. Id., at 327. The 
defendant was denied that right when he was subjected to an 
"all-night inquisition," during which police ignored his re-
peated requests for his lawyer. Ibid. 
The Court in M assiah adopted the reasoning of the concur-
ring opinions in Spano and held that, once a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has attached, he is denied that 
right when federal agents "deliberately elicit" incriminating 
statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. 377 
U. S., at 206. The Court adopted this test, rather than one 
that turned simply on whether the statements were obtained 
in an "interrogation," to protect accused persons from" 'indi-
rect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those con-
ducted in the jailhouse. In this case, Massiah was more seri-
ously imposed upon . . . because he did not even know that he 
was under interrogation by a government agent.'" Ibid., 
quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d 62, 72-73 (1962) 
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the Court made clear 
that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative 
techniques that were equivalent to interrogation> and that it 
so viewed the technique in issue in M assiah. 20 
In United States v. Henry, the Court applied the Massiah 
test to incriminating statements made to a jailhouse inform-
ant. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of 
M assiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in 
conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and 
confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] re-
20 The defendant in M assiah made the incriminating statements in a con-
versation with one of his confederates, who had secretly agreed to permit 
government agents to listen to the conversation over a radio transmitter. 
The agents instructed the confederate to "engage Massiah in conversation 
relating to the alleged crimes." United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d, at 72 
(Hays, J., dissenting in part). 
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vealed incriminating information." 447 U. S., at 269. This 
Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals reasonably 
concluded that the government informant "deliberately used 
his position to secure incriminating information from [the de-
fendant] when counsel was not present." I d., at 270. Al-
though the informant had not questioned the defendant, the 
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant 
in orde:t; to "elicit" incriminating information. I d., at 273; 
see id., at 271, n. 9. The Court emphasized that those facts, 
like the facts of M assiah, amounted to "'indirect and surrep-
titious interrogatio[n]'" of the defendant. I d., at 273. 
Earlier this term, we applied the M assiah standard in a 
case involving incriminating statements made under circum-
stances substantially similar to the facts of M assiah itself. 
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. -- (1985), the defendant 
made incriminating statements in a meeting with his accom-
plice, who had agreed to cooperate with the police. During 
that meeting, the accomplice, who wore a wire transmitter to 
record the conversation, discussed with the defendant the 
charges pending against him, repeatedly asked the defendant 
to remind him of the details of the crime, and encouraged the 
defendant to describe his plan for killing witnesses. I d., at 
The Court concluded that these investigatory tech-
niques denied the defendant his right to counsel on the pend-
ing charges. 21 Significantly, the Court emphasized that, be-
cause of the relationship between the defendant and the 
informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active 
conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit" 
incriminating statements from the defendant. I d., at --, 
n. 13. Thus, the informant's participation "in this conversa-
tion was 'the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Ibid. 
21 The Court observed, however, that where the defendant makes "[i]n-
criminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth 
Amendment right has not yet attached," those statements "are, of course, 
admissible at a trial of those offenses." Maine v. Molton, supra, at - . 
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(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U. S., at 277 (POWELL, 
J., concurring)). 
As our recent recent examination of this Sixth Amendment 
issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary concern of the 
M assiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investiga-
tory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police in-
terrogation. Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated 
whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains in-
criminating statements from the accused after the right to 
counsel has attached," 474 U. S., at --, citing United 
States v. Henry, supra, at 276 (POWELL, J., concurring), a 
defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply 
by showing that an informant, either through prior arrange-
ment or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to 
the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that 
the police and their informant took some action, beyond 
m~rely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit in-
criminating remarks. 
B 
It is thus apparent that the Court of Appeals erred in con-
cluding that respondent's right to counsel was violated under 
the circumstances of this case. Its error did not stem from 
any disagreement with the District Court over appropriate 
resolution of the question reserved in Henry, but rather from 
its implicit conclusion that this case did not present that open 
question. That conclusion was based on a fundamental mis-
take, namely, the Court of Appeals' failure to accord to the 
state trial court's factual findings the presumption of correct-
ness expressly required by 28 U.S. C. §2254(d). Patton v. 
Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 
(1981). 
The state court found that Officer Cullen had instructed 
Lee only to listen to respondent for the purpose of determin-
ing the identities of the other participants in the robbery and 
murder. The police already had solid evidence of respond-
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ent's participation. 22 The court further found that Lee fol-
lowed those instructions, that he "at no time asked any ques-
tions" of respondent concerning the pending chargest and 
that he "only listened" to respondent's "spontaneous" and 
"unsolicited" statements. The only remark made by Lee 
that has any support in this record was his comment that re-
spondent's initial version of his participation in the crimes 
"didn't sound too good." Without holding that any of the 
state court's findings were not entitled to the presumption of 
correctness under § 2254(d), 23 the Court of Appeals focused on 
that one remark and gave a description of Lee's interaction 
with respondent that is completely at odds with the facts 
found by the trial court. In the Court of Appeals' view, 
"Subtly and slowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal inter-
course with [respondent] served to exacerbate [respondent's] 
already troubled state of mind." 24 7 42 F. 2d, at 7 45. After 
thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring 
other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incrimi-
nating statements. Ibid. This conclusion conflicts with the 
decision of every other state and federal judge who reviewed 
this record, and is clear error in light of the provisions and 
intent of§ 2254(d). 
22 Eyewitnesses had identified respondent as the man they saw fleeing 
from the garage with an armful of money. 
28 The majority did not respond to Judge Van Graafeiland's criticism that 
the court could not "dispense with the presumption that the State court's 
factual findings are correct without an adequate explanation as to why the 
findings are not fairly supported by the record." 742 F . 2d, at 749 (cita-
tions omitted). 
24 Curiously, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that respondent 
was placed in a cell that overlooked the scene of his crimes. !d., at 745. 
For all the record shows, however, that fact was sheer coincidence. Nor 
do we perceive any reason to require police to isolate one charged with 
crime so that he cannot view the scene, whatever it may be, from his cell 
window. 
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v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JusTICE MARSHALL joins, J 
dissenting. 
Because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly con-
cluded that the "ends of justice" would be served by plenary 
consideration of respondent's second federal habeas petition 
and that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), di-
rectly controls the merits of this case, I dissent. 
I 
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 15 (1963), we 
held that a federal court may refuse to entertain a successive 
petition for habeas relief where "the ends of justice would not 
be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent applica-
tion." The decision whether to hear a successive petition, 
we stated, was committed "to the sound discretion of the fed-
eral trial judges." I d., at 18. We declined to define pre-
cisely "the ends of justice," observing that the phrase "cannot 
be too finely particularized." I d., at 17. 
~~ 






Today four Members of the Court argue that we should re-
ject Sanders' "sound discretion" standard and contend that 
the ends of justice are served by reconsideration of issues 
raised in previous federal habeas petitions only where the lo 
~ 
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prisoner can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. 1 
Ante, at --. In support of this standard for consideration 
of successive petitions, the plurality advances a revisionist l 
theory of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. The plu- 1 
rality implies that federal habeas review is not available as a 
matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his first federal 
petition a properly preserved claim that his conviction was 
obtained in violation of constitutional commands. Rather, 
the plurality suggests that a prisoner is entitled to habeas re- I 
lief only if his interest in freedom from unconstitutional incar-
ceration outweighs the State's interests in the administration 
of its criminal laws. Ante, at--, --. The plurality's 1 
further intimates that federal review of state court convic-
tions under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 is predicated solely on the 
need to prevent the incarceration of an innocent person, stat-
ing that "[d]espite [the substantial] costs [federal habeas re-
view imposes upon the States], Congress has continued to af-
ford federal habeas relief in appropriate cases, 'recognizing 
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent [person] to suffer an unconstitutional 
loss ofliberty."' Ante, at--, n. 16 (Slip Opinion 16, n. 15) 
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491-492, n. 31 
(1976)). Having thus implied that factual innocence is cen- \ 
tral to our habeas jurisprudence generally, the plurality ·de- I 
clares that it is fundamental to the proper interpretation of 
"the ends of justice." Neither the plurality's standard for 1 
consideration of successive petitions nor its theory of habeas 
corpus is supported by statutory language, legislative his-
tory, or our precedents. 
At least since the middle of this century, whei_YWe decided 
lj:Valey v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942), and"Brown v. Al-
len, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), it has been clear that "habeas lies to 
inquire into every constitutional defect in any criminal trial," 
'While a majority of the Court today rejects, either implicity or explic-
itly, this argument, I believe it appropriate to explain why the plurality's 
view is incorrect. 
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vMackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 685-686 (1971) (Har-
lan, J., concurring and dissenting), that has not been proce-
durally defaulted, with the narrow exception of Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule claims. Stone v. Powell, 
supra. As we stated just two Terms ago, there is "no doubt 
that in enacting § 2254, Congress sought to 'interpose the fed-
eral courts between the States and the people, as guardians 
of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from un-
constitutionar action."' vReed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 1, 10 (1984) 
(quoting 'Mitchum v. Forster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972)). 
Contrary to the plurality's assertions, the Court has never 
delineated the general scope of the writ by weighing the com-
peting interests of the prisoner and the State. Our cases ad-
dressing the propriety of federal collateral review of constitu-
tional error made at trial or on appeal have balanced these 
interests solely with respect to claims that were procedurally 
defaulted in state court. See, e. g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U. S. 72 (1977), Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107 (1982); 
Murray v. Carrier, -- U. S. -- (1986). Recognizing 
that "the State's interest in the integrity of its rules and pro-
ceedings and the finality of its judgments ... would be un-
dermined if the federal courts were too free to ignore proce-
dural forfeitures in state court," Reed v. Ross, supra, at 10, 
we held in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, that a state prisoner 
generally must show cause and actual prejudice in order to 
obtain federal habeas corpus relief of a procedurally defaulted 
claim. See also Engle v. Isaac, supra. But even as we es-
tablished the cause and prejudice standard in Wainwright v. 
Sykes, supra, we emphasized that the "rule" of Brown v. Al-
len, supra, "that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he 
is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in 
violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have 
the federal habeas court make its own independent deter-
mination of his federal claim ... is in no way changed," by 
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our adoption of special rules for procedurally defaulted 
claims. Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 87. 2 
Furthermore, Stone v. Powell, supra, on which the plural-
ity heavily relies, did not establish a new regime for federal 
habeas corpus under which the prisoner's interests are 
weighed against the State's interests and under which he 
usually forfeits habeas review unless he can make out a color-
able showing of factual innocence or unless the constitutional 
right he seeks to protect generally furthers the accuracy of 
factfinding at trial. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell, the Court 
expressly stated that its "decision ... [was] not concerned 
with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for 
litigating constitutional claims generally." I d., at 495, n. 37 
(emphasis in original). Rather, the Court simply "reaf-
firm[ed] that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rem-
edy rather than a personal constitutional right . . . and . . . 
emphasiz[ed] the minimal utility of the [exclusionary] rule" in 
the context of federal collateral proceedings. Ibid. Subse-
quent cases have uniformly construed Stone v. Powell as cre-
ating a special rule only for Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule claims and have repeatedly refused to extend its limita-
tions on federal habeas review to any other context. 
·Kimmelman v. Morrison,-- U. S. -- (1986) (declining 
to extend Stone v. Powell to Sixth Amendment right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel claims where the principal alle-
gation and manifestation of inadequate representation is 
counsel's failure to litigate adequately a Fourth Amendment 
claim); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (declining to ex-
2 In other words, we have recognized an exception to the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction in the unusual cases where respect for the procedures of 
state courts make this appropriate; such an exception is similar to absten-
tion rules. See, e. g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co. 319 U. S. 315 (1943). However, like other judicially created 
exceptions to federal jurisdiction conferred by Congress, it is a narrow ex-
ception to the "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise that jurisdiction. 
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tend Stone v. Powell to claims of racial discrimination in the 
selection of grand jury foremen); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U. S. 307 (1979) (declining to extend Stone v. Powell to 
claims by state prisoners that the evidence in support of their 
convictions was not sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact 
to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as required under In 
re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)). 
Despite the plurality's intimations, we simply have never I~ ~ ~ 
held that federal habeas review ~ro erly resented, .L-~ 
nondefaulted constitutional claims is lim1tea either to con- ~ 1 · 
stitutional protections that advance the accuracy of the  ~ 
factfinding process at trial or is available solely to prisoners __ j.../ 
who can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence. S ~ PY 
__; 
On the contrary, we have stated expressly that on habeas re- --;--
view "what we have to deal with is not the petitioners' inno-~ ~ 
cence or guilt but solely the question whether their coristitu- ~ L ~ 
tional rights have been preserved." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U. S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.). Congress has vested 
habeas jurisdiction in the federal courts over all cases in ~ 
which the petitioner claims he has been detained "in violation 
of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States," 28 ~ 1 
U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3), and, "[t]he constitutional rights of crim- 0 
inal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty . 
alike." Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra, at--. Thus: 
. "Even if punishment ~he 'gu~: were society's highest 
value ... in a constitution th~:~me] Members of this 
Court would prefer, that is not the ?rdering of priorities 
under the Constitution forged by tpe Framers . . . . 
Particular constitutional rights tryat do not affect the 
fairness of factfinding proced~:~s;annot for that reason 
be denied at the trial itself. w Jla~ possible justification 
then can there be for denying indication of such right's 
on federal habeas when state ourts do deny those rights 
at trial?" Stone v. Powell, 4 8 U. S., at 523-525 (BREN-
NAN, J., dissenting). 
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The habeas statute itself certainly does not provide any jus-
tification, either for limiting the scope of habeas review gen-
erally or for narrowly defining the ends of justice to make ha-
beas relief available on a successive petition only to prisoners 
who can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. 
With respect to the general scope of federal habeas review, 
§ 2241 , which grants federal courts the statutory authority to 
issue writs of habeas corpus, makes no mention of guilt and 
innocence or of the need to balance the interests of the State 
and the prisoner. In pertinent part, it states simply that 
"[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner un-
less-[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3). 
Nor does anything in the legislative history of the habeas 
statute support the view that Congress intended to limit ha-
beas review in the manner proposed by the Court. For 
more than 30 years, our construction of the habeas statute to 
permit federal collateral review of virtually all nondefaulted 
constitutional claims-with the narrow exception, over dis-
sent, of Fourth Amendment claims, without reference to ac-
tual guilt or innocence or to the competing interests of the 
State and the prisoner, has been unmistakably clear. See, 
Brown v. Allen, supra. Several times during this period, 
Congress has had the Court's interpretation expressly 
brought to its attention through bills proposing drastic revi-
sion of federal habeas jurisdiction. See L. Yackle, Postcon-
viction Remedies § 19, pp. 91-92 (1981) (describing relevant 
bills introduced in past several Congresses). Each of those 
times, Congress steadfastly refused to make any significant I ( ) 
changes in this Court's construction of that jurisdiction. 
§ 19, id., at 92 ("[S]ince 1948 the only amendments to the [ha-
beas] statutes that the Congress has approved have ... sim-
ply tracked contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions") 
(footnote omitted). The fact that Congress has been made 
aware of our longstanding construction and has chosen to 
leave it undisturbed, "lends powerful support to [its] contin-
; 
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ued viability." Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff 
Bur., 476 U. S. -,- (1986). 
With regard to the specific question whether factual inno-
cence is a precondition for review of a successive habeas peti-
tion, neither § 2244(b)-which governs applications for writs 
of habeas corpus to state courts that are filed subsequent to 
the disposition of a prior federal habeas petition, its legisla-
tive history, nor the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in 
the United States District Courts (hereafter Rules Govern-
ing Section 2254), support the plurality's position. Section 
2244(b), as amended in 1966, states in relevant part that a 
subsequent petition "need not be entertained ... unless the 
application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other 
ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier applica-
tion for the writ, and unless the court ... is satisfied that the 
applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately with-
held the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the 
writ." (Emphasis added). By its very terms, then, 
§ 2244(b) merely informs district courts that they need not 
consider successive petitions; that is, the statute gives dis-
trict courts the discretion not to hear such petitions. Simi-
larly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254, which 
were adopted in 1976, states that a "second or successive pe-
tition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege 
new or different grounds for relief and the prior determina-
tion was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are 
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to 
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse 
of the writ." (Emphasis added). 






mine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear -~b=~~/::llll ..... _. J d> ?'i -#4 - ll 
by reference to the Sanders ends of justice standard. First, ~
not ing m t e ouse or ena · eyora-accbnlpanying the .a-
bill that amended § 2244 in 1966 suggests that Congress ~f--
wished to abandon the Sanders standard. See H. R. Rep.  
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Gong., 2d Sess. (1966). Second, the legislative history of the 
Rules Governing Section 2254 demonstrates that in adopting 
Rule 9(b) Congress expressly endorsed the existing case law 
governing subsequent petitions and cited Sanders. 3 H. R. 
Rep. No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976). Third, the Advisory 
Committee's Notes relating to Rule 9(b) state that Sanders 
provides the relevant standards for subsequent petitions and 
indicate that the district courts have the discretion to refuse 
to entertain vexatious and meritless subsequent petitions: 
"In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the 
court, in dealing with the problem of successive applica-
tions, stated: 
"'Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior 
application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only 
if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent appli-
cation was determined adversely to the applicant on the 
prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the 
merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by 
reaching the merits of the subsequent application.' 
[Emphasis added]." 
"Sanders, [28] U. S. C. § 2244, and [Rule 9(b)] make it 
clear that the court has the discretion to entertain a suc-
cessive application. 
"Subdivision (b) is consistent with the important and 
well established purpose of habeas corpus. It does not 
eliminate a remedy to which the petitioner is rightfully 
entitled. However, in Sanders, the court pointed out: 
3 While the discussion in the House Report regarding Rule 9(b) focuses 
on that portion of the rule that governs abuse of the writ, rather than peti-
tions that repeatedly allege the same claims, it is clear that the Committee 
intended Rule 9(b) to conform in its entirety to existing case law, particu-
larly to Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963). See H. R. Rep. 
No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976). 
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"'Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires 
the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litiga-
tion, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only 
purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.' 373 U. S. at 18. 
" ... In rare instances, the court may feel a need to 
entertain a petition alleging grounds that have already 
been decided on the merits. Sanders, 373 U. S. at 1, 
16. However, abusive use of the writ should be discour-
aged, and instances of abuse are frequent enough to re-
quire a means of dealing with them. For example, a 
successive application, already decided on the merits, 
may be submitted in the hope of getting before a differ-
ent judge in multijudge courts. . . . This subdivision 
is aimed at screening out the abusive petitions . . . so 
that the more meritorious petitions can get quicker and 
fuller consideration." 28 U. S. C., p. 358. 
The Advisory Committee gave no indication that the prob-
lem Rule 9(b), or § 2244(b), seek to correct is that of a guilty 
prisoner seeking repeated federal review of the same con-
stitutional claim. Rather, it is apparent that the Rule at-
tempts to remedy only the problem posed by vexatious and 
meritless subsequent petitions. The Committee explicitly 
contemplated, though, that nonabusive, "meritorious [subse-
quent] petitions" would receive "full[] consideration." Ibid. 
When we review habeas cases, our task is "to give fair ef-
fect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction enacted by Congress." 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 500 (opinion of Frankfurter, 
J.). With respect to successive habeas petitions, giving "fair 
effect" to the intent of Congress is to construe "the ends of 
justice" as Sanders did-to mean that it is within the sound 
discretion of the court to refuse to hear abusive, meritless pe-
titions and to hear petitions in which the prisoner advances a 
potentially meritorious claim and provides a good justifica-
tion for returning to court a second time with the same 
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claim. 4 
In the instant case, respondent alleged a potentially meri-
torious Sixth Amendment claim. He also advanced a com-
plete justification for returning to federal court a second time 
with this claim. Between his first and second federal habeas 
petitions, this Court decided United States v. Henry, 447 
U. S. 264 (1980) , a case in which the facts were substantially 
similar to the facts of respondent's case 5 and in which we 
elaborated on the Sixth Amendment's prohibition against 
government interference with an accused's right to counsel, a 
prohibition that we had previously recognized in M assiah v. 
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U. S. 387 (1977). The intervention of Henry, supra, 
clarified the appropriate analysis for Sixth Amendment 
claims like respondent's; thus the Court of Appeals did not 
abuse its discretion by granting reconsideration of respond-
ent's constitutional claim under the dispositive legal 
standard. 6 
• I agree with the plurality that actual innocence constitutes a sufficient 
justification for returning to court a secona t1me with the same claim. I do 
not agree, though, that a prisoner's inability to make a showing of actual 
innocence negates an otherwise good justification, such as respondent's. 
s The facts of this case demonstrate the ·arbitrariness of the Court's rule. 
The initial federal habeas petitions filed by respondent and by Henry pre-
sented virtually identical claims. Because our decision in United States v. 
Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), may have altered the law of the Circuit in 
which respondent's prior petition failed , it is only just that respondent's 
claim be reviewed under the proper constitutional standards. 
6 The plurality's factual innocence standard also presents some signifi-
cant institutional problems. First, this standard requires the federal 
courts to function in much the same capacity as the state trier of fact-the 
federal courts must make a rough decision on the question of guilt or inno-
cence. This requirement diverts the federal courts from the central pur-
pose of habeas review-the evaluation of claims that convictions were ob-
tained in violation of the Constitution. Second, it is unclear what 
relevance the plurality's standard would have in a case in which a prisoner 
alleges constitutional error in the sentencing phase of a capital case. Guilt 
or innocence is irrelevant in that context; rather, there is only a decision 
made by representatives of the community whether the prisoner shall live 
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II 
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred with re-
spect to the merits of respondent's habeas petition. Accord-
ing to the Court, the Court of Appeals failed to accord 
§ 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness to the state trial 
court's findings that respondent's cellmate, Lee, "at no time 
asked any questions" of respondent concerning the pending 
charges, and that Lee only listened to respondent's "sponta-
neous" and "unsolicited" statements, App. 62-63. As a re-
sult, the Court concludes, the Court of Appeals failed to rec-
ognize that this case presents the question, reserved in 
Henry, supra, whether the Sixth Amendment forbids the ad-
mission into evidence of an accused's statements to a 
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but 
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged." Id., at 271, n. 9. I disagree with the Court's 
characterization of the Court of Appeals' treatment of the 
state court's findings and, consequently, I disagree with the 
Court that the instant case presents the "listening post" ' 
question. 
The state trial court simply found that Lee did not ask re-
spondent any direct questions about the crime for which re-
spondent was incarcerated. App. 62-63. The trial court 
considered the significance of this fact only under State prec-
edents, which the court interpreted to require affirmative 
"interrogation" by the informant as a prerequisite to a con-
stitutional violation. I d., at 63. The court did not indicate 
whether it referred to a Fifth Amendment or to a Sixth 
Amendment violation in identifying "interrogation" as a pre-
condition to a violation; it merely stated that "the utterances 
made by [respondent] to Lee were unsolicited, and volun-
tarily made and did not violate the defendant's Constitutional 
rights." Ibid. 
or die. Presumably, then, the plurality's test would not be applicable to 
such claims. 
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The Court of Appeals did not disregard the state court's 
finding that Lee asked respondent no direct questions re-
garding the crime. Rather, the Court of Appeals expressly 
accepted that finding, Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741, 
745 (CA2 1984) ("[e]ven accepting that Lee did not ask Wil-
son any direct questions, ... "), but concluded that, as a mat-
ter of law, the deliberate elicitation standard of Henry, 
supra, and Massiah, supra, encompasses other, more subtle 
forms of stimulating incriminating admissions than overt 
questioning. The court suggested that the police deliber-
ately placed respondent in a cell that overlooked the scene of 
the crime, hoping that the view would trigger an inculpatory 
comment to respondent's cellmate. 7 The court also ob-
served that, while Lee asked respondent no questions, Lee 
nonetheless stimulated conversation concerning respondents' 
role in the Star Taxicab Garage robbery and murder by re-
marking that respondent's exculpatory story did not "'sound 
too good'" and that he had better come up with a better one. 
742 F. 2d, at 745 . . Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the respondent's case did not present the situation reserved 
in Henry, where an accused makes an incriminating remark 
within the hearing of a jailhouse informant, who "makes no 
effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged." 
447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. Instead, the court determined this 
case to be virtually indistinguishable from Henry. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused, at least 
after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on 
counsel as the "medium" between himself and the State. 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. --, -- (1985). Accord-
ingly, the Sixth Amendment "imposes on the State an affirm-
ative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice 
to seek [the assistance of counsel]," id., at--, and there-
fore "[t]he determination whether particular action by state 
7 The Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s soon as Wilson arrived and 
viewed the garage, he became upset and stated that "someone's messing 
with me,'" 742 F. 2d, at 745. 
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agents violates the accused's right to ... counsel must be 
made in light of this obligation." I d., at -- - --. To be 
sure, the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever, "by 
luck or happenstance," the State obtains incriminating state-
ments from the accused after the right to counsel has at-
tached. It is violated, however, when "the State obtains in-
criminating statements by knowingly circumventing the 
accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation be-
tween the accused and a state agent." I d., at (footnote omit-
ted). As we explained in Henry, where the accused has not 
waived his right to counsel, the government knowingly cir-
cumvents the defendant's right to counsel where it "deliber-
ately elicit[s]" inculpatory admissions, 447 U. S., at 270, that 
is, "intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce [the ac-
cused] to make incriminating statements without the assist-
ance of counsel." I d., at 27 4. 
In Henry, we found that the Federal Government had "de-
liberately elicited" incriminating statements from Henry 
based on the following circumstances. The jailhouse inform-
ant, Nichols, had apparently followed instructions to obtain 
information without directly questioning Henry and without 
initiating conversations concerning the charges pending 
against Henry. We rejected the Government's argument 
that because Henry initiated the discussion of his crime, no 
Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. We pointed out 
that under M assiah, supra, it is irrelevant whether the in-
formant asks pointed questions about the crime or "merely 
engage[s] in general conversation about it." 447 U. S., at 
271-272, and n. 10. Nichols, we noted, "was not a passive 
listener; ... he had 'some conversations with Mr. Henry' 
. while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements 
were 'the product of this conversation."' I d., at 271. 
In deciding that Nichols' role in these conversations 
amounted to deliberate elicitation, we also found three other 
factors important. First, Nichols was to be paid for any in-
formation he produced and thus had an incentive to extract 
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inculpatory admissions from Henry. /d., at 270. Second, 
Henry was not aware that Nichols was acting as .an inform-
ant. Ibid. "Conversation stimulated in such circum-
stances," we observed, "may elicit information that an ac-
cused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be 
Government agents." !d., at 273. Third, Henry was incus-
tody at the time he spoke with Nichols. This last fact is sig-
nificant, we stated, because "custody imposes pressures on 
the accused [and] confinement may bring into play subtle in-
fluences that will make him particularly susceptible to the 
ploys of undercover Government agents." I d., at 27 4. We 
concluded that by "intentionally creating a situation likely to 
induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the 
assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel." Ibid. (footnote omitted). 
In the instant case, as in Henry, the accused was incarcer-
ated and therefore was "susceptible to the ploys of under-
cover Government agents." Ibid. Like Nichols, Lee was a 
secret informant, usually received consideration for the serv-
ices he rendered the police, and therefore had an incentive to 
produce the information which he knew the police hoped to 
obtain. Just as Nichols had done, Lee obeyed instructions 
not to question respondent and to report to the police any 
statements made by the respondent in Lee's presence about 
the crime in question. App. 62. And, like Nichols, Lee en-
couraged respondent to talk about his crime by conversing 
with him on the subject over the course of several days and 
by telling respondent that his exculpatory story would not 
convince anyone without more work. However, unlike the 
situation in Henry, a disturbing visit from respondent's 
brother, rather than a conversation with the informant, 
seems to have been the immediate catalyst for respondent's 
confession to Lee. Ante, at--; Wilson v. Henderson, 82 
Civ. 4397 (SDNY, Mar. 30, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 
25a-26a. While it might appear from this sequence of events 
that Lee's comment regarding respondent's story and his 
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general willingness to converse with respondent about the 
crime were not the immediate causes of respondent's admis-
sion, I think that the deliberate elicitation standard requires 
consideration of the entire course of government behavior. 
The State intentionally created a situation in which it was 
forseeable that respondent would make incriminating state-
ments without the assistance of counsel, Henry, supra, at 
274--it assigned respondent to a cell overlooking the scene of 
the crime and designated a secret informant to be respond-
ent's cellmate. The informant, while avoiding direct ques-
tions, nonetheless developed a relationship of cellmate cama-
raderie with respondent and encouraged him to talk about his 
crime. While the coup de grace was delivered by respond-
ent's brother, the groundwork for respondent's confession 
was laid by the State. Clearly the State's actions had a suffi-
cient nexus with respondent's admission of guilt to constitute 
deliberate elicitation within the meaning of Henry. I would 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, 
dissenting. 
Because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly con-
cluded that the "ends of justice" would be served by plenary 
consideration of respondent's second federal habeas petition 
and that United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), 
directly controls the merits of this case, I dissent. 
I 
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 15 (1963), we 
held that a federal court may refuse to entertain a successive 
petition for habeas relief where "the ends of justice would not 
be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent applica-
tion." The decision whether to hear a successive petition, 
we stated, was committed "to the sound discretion of the fed-
eral trial judges." I d., at 18. We declined to define pre-
cisely "the ends of justice," observing that the phrase "cannot 
be too finely particularized." ld., at 17. 
Today four Members of the Court argue that we should re-
ject Sanders' "sound discretion" standard and contend that 
the ends of justice are served by reconsideration of issues 
raised in previous federal habeas petitions only where the 
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prisoner can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. 1 
Ante, at--. In support of this standard for consideration 
of successive petitions, the plurality advances a revisionist 
theory of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. The plu-
rality implies that federal habeas review is not available as a 
matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his first federal 
petition a properly preserved claim that his conviction was 
obtained in violation of constitutional commands. Rather, 
the plurality suggests that a prisoner is entitled to habeas re-
lief only if his interest in freedom from unconstitutional incar-
ceration outweighs the State's interests in the administration 
of its criminal laws. Ante, at --, --. The plurality's 
further intimates that federal review of state court convic-
tions under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 is predicated solely on the 
need to prevent the incarceration of an innocent person, stat-
ing that "[d]espite [the substantial] costs [federal habeas re-
view imposes upon the States], Congress has continued to af-
ford federal habeas relief in appropriate cases, 'recognizing 
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent [person] to suffer an unconstitutional 
loss of liberty."' Ante, at--, n. 16 (Slip Opinion 16, n. 15) 
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491-492, n. 31 
(1976)). Having thus implied that factual innocence is cen-
tral to our habeas jurisprudence generally, the plurality de-
clares that it is fundamental to the proper interpretation of 
"the ends of justice." Neither the plurality's standard for 
consideration of successive petitions nor its theory of habeas 
corpus is supported by statutory language, legislative his-
tory, or our pr-ecedents. 2 
'While a majority of the Court today rejects, either implicity or explic-
itly, this argument, I believe it appropriate to explain why the plurality's 
view is incorrect. 
2 The plurality asserts, ante, at-, n. 18 (Slip op. at 18, n. 18), that it 
addresses only the standard applicable to successive habeas petitions and 
that I mischaracterize its opinion by suggesting that the dictum, contained 
in Part II-B of the plurality's opinion, regarding the purpose and the scope 
of the Great Writ has any significance. While the plurality correctly 
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At least since the middle of this century, when we decided 
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942), and Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), it has been clear that "habeas lies 
to inquire into every constitutional defect in any criminal 
trial," Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 685-686 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), that has not 
been procedurally defaulted, with the narrow exception of 
states that what would have been the holding of Part III of its opinion, had 
that Part commanded a Court, would have directly governed only succes-
sive petitions, methinks my brothers and sister protest too much about 
their general discussion of the writ. In order to mask the fact that it fash-
ions its actual innocence standard from whole cloth, the plurality attempts 
to justify that standard by reference to the plurality's view of "the historic 
function of habeas corpus." !d., at-- (Slip op. at 14); see also id. , at 
--(Slip op. at 17). Consequently, in order to comment upon the plurali-
ty's standard for successive petitions, I find it necessary first to address 
the plurality's treatment of the general scope and purposes of the Great 
Writ. Thus, the "first six pages of the dissent," id. , at --, (slip. op. at 
18, n. 18), has as much h levance1t o this case as does Part 11-B of the plu-
rality's opinion. 
The plurality further chastises me for failing to propose a precise defini-
tion of the "ends of justice" standard of Sanders v. United States , 373 U. S. 
1, 15 (1963) and for adhering to Sanders by leaving the decision whether to 
hear successive petitions to the "sound discretion of the federal trial 
judges." I d., at 18. The plurality argues that Sanders left open "the 
question of what considerations should inform a court's decision that suc-
cessive review of an issue previously decided will serve the 'ends of jus-
tice.'" Ante, at -- (slip op. at 19, n. 18). Sanders did leave that ques-
tion open, but in a different sense than the plurality suggests. In 
Sanders, we acknowledged that the meaning of the phrase "the ends of jus-
tice . . . cannot be too finely particularized," supra, at 17, and, in recogni-
tion of this fact , we left it to the "sound discretion" of federal trial judges to 
make case-by-case determinations of what the ends of justice require. 
The plurality, while purporting merely to elucidate Sanders "sound discre-
tion" standard, would replace discretion with a single legal standard-ac-
tual innocence. And, while the plurality asserts that there is a need for a 
more refined standard, it offers no evidence that, over the 23 years since 
Sanders was decided, federal trial courts have had difficulty applying the 
"sound discretion" standard or have so abused their discretion with respect 
to successive petitions that revision of our longstanding interpretation of 
§ 2244(b) is warranted. 
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Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims. Stone v. Pow-
ell, supra. As we stated just two Terms ago, there is "no 
doubt that in enacting § 2254, Congress sought to 'interpose 
the federal courts between the States and the people, as 
guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the peo-
ple from unconstitutional action."' Reed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 
1, 10 (1984) (quoting Mitchum v. Forster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 
(1972)). 
Contrary to the plurality's assertions, the Court has never 
delineated the general scope of the writ by weighing the com-
peting interests of the prisoner and the State. Our cases ad-
dressing the propriety of federal collateral review of constitu-
tional error made at trial or on appeal have balanced these 
interests solely with respect to claims that were procedurally 
defaulted in state court. See, e. g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U. S. 72 (1977), Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107 (1982); 
Murray v. Carrier, -- U. S. -- (1986). Recognizing 
that "the State's interest in the integrity of its rules and pro-
ceedings and the finality of its judgments . . . would be un-
dermined if the federal courts were too free to ignore proce-
dural forfeitures in state court," Reed v. Ross, supra, at 10, 
we held in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, that a state prisoner 
generally must show cause and actual prejudice in order to 
obtain federal habeas corpus relief of a procedurally defaulted 
claim. See also Engle v. Isaac, supra. But even as we es-
tablished the cause and prejudice standard in Wainwright v. 
Sykes, supra, we emphasized that the "rule" of Brown v. Al-
len, supra, "that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he 
is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court in 
violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have 
the federal habeas court make its own independent deter-
mination of his federal claim ... is in no way changed," by 
our adoption of special rules for procedurally defaulted 
claims. Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 87. 3 
3 In other words , we have recognized an exception to the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction in the unusual cases where respect for the procedures of 
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Furthermore, Stone v. Powell, supra, on which the plural-
ity heavily relies, did not establish a new regime for federal 
habeas corpus under which the prisoner's interests are 
weighed against the State's interests and under which he 
usually forfeits habeas review unless he can make out a color-
able showing of factual innocence or unless the constitutional 
right he seeks to protect generally furthers the accuracy of 
factfinding at trial. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell, the Court 
expressly stated that its "decision ... [was] not concerned 
with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for 
litigating constitutional claims generally." I d., at 495, n. 37 
(emphasis in original). Rather, the Court simply "reaf-
firm[ed] that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rem-
edy rather than a personal constitutional right . . . and . . . 
emphasiz[ed] the minimal utility of the [exclusionary] rule" in 
the context of federal collateral proceedings. Ibid. Subse-
quent cases have uniformly construed Stone v. Powell as cre-
ating a special rule only for Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule claims and have repeatedly refused to extend its limita-
tions on federal habeas review to any other context. 
Kimmelman v. Morrison,-- U.S.-- (1986) (declining 
to extend Stone v. Powell to Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel claims where the principal allega-
tion and manifestation of inadequate representation is coun-
sel's failure to litigate adequately a Fourth Amendment 
claim); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (declining to ex-
tend Stone v. Powell to claims of racial discrimination in the 
selection of grand jury foremen); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U. S. 307 (1979) (declining to extend_ Stone v. Powell to 
state courts make this appropriate; such an exception is similar to absten-
tion rules. See, e. g., Younger v. Harris , 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co. 319 U. S. 315 (1943). However, like other judicially created 
exceptions to federal jurisdiction conferred by Congress, it is a narrow ex-
ception to the "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise that jurisdiction. 
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 
817 (1976). 
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claims by state prisoners that the evidence in support of their 
convictions was not sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact 
to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as required under In 
re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)). 
Despite the plurality's intimations, we simply have never 
held that federal habeas review of properly presented, 
nondefaulted constitutional claims is limited either to con-
stitutional protections that advance the accuracy of the 
factfinding process at trial or is available solely to prisoners 
who can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence. 
On the contrary, we have stated expressly that on habeas re-
view "what we have to deal with is not the petitioners' inno-
cence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitu-
tional rights have been preserved." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U. S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.). Congress has vested 
habeas jurisdiction in the federal courts over all cases in 
which the petitioner claims he has been detained "in violation 
of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States," 28 
U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3), and, "[t]he constitutional rights of crim-
inal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty 
alike." Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra, at--. Thus: 
"Even if punishment of the 'guilty' were society's highest 
value ... in a constitution that [some] Members of this 
Court would prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities 
under the Constitution forged by the Framers 
Particular constitutional rights that do not affect the 
fairness of factfinding procedures cannot for that reason 
be denied at the trial itself. What possible justification 
then can there be for denying vindication of such rights 
on federal habeas when state courts do deny those rights 
at trial?" Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 523-525 (BREN-
NAN, J., dissenting). 
The habeas statute itself certainly does not provide any jus-
tification, either for limiting the scope of habeas review gen-
erally or for narrowly defining the ends of justice to make ha-
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beas relief available on a successive petition only to prisoners 
who can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. 
With respect to the general scope of federal habeas review, 
§ 2241, which grants federal courts the statutory authority to 
issue writs of habeas corpus, makes no mention of guilt and 
innocence or of the need to balance the interests of the State 
and the prisoner. In pertinent part, it states simply that 
"[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner un-
less-[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States." 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3). 
Nor does anything in the legislative history of the habeas 
statute support the view that Congress intended to limit ha-
beas review in the manner proposed by the Court. For 
more than 30 years, our construction of the habeas statute to 
permit federal collateral review of virtually all nondefaulted 
constitutional claims-with the narrow exception, over dis-
sent, of Fourth Amendment claims, without reference to ac-
tual guilt or innocence or to the competing interests of the 
State and the prisoner, has been unmistakably clear. See, 
Brown v. Allen, supra. Several times during this period, 
Congress has had the Court's interpretation expressly 
brought to its attention through bills proposing drastic revi-
sion of federal habeas jurisdiction. See L. Yackle, Postcon-
viction Remedies § 19, pp. 91-92 (1981) (describing relevant 
bills introduced in past several Congresses). Each of those 
times, Congress steadfastly refused to make any significant 
changes in this Court's construction of that jurisdiction. 
§ 19, id., at 92 ("[S]ince 1948 the only amendments to the [ha-
beas] statut~s that the Congress has approved have ... sim-
ply tracked contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions") 
(footnote omitted). The fact that Congress has been made 
aware of our longstanding construction and has chosen to 
leave it undisturbed, "lends powerful support to [its] contin-
ued viability." Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff 
Bur., 476 U.S.-,- (1986). 
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With regard to the specific question whether factual inno-
cence is a precondition for review of a successive habeas peti-
tion, neither § 2244(b)-which governs applications for writs 
of habeas corpus to state courts that are filed subsequent to 
the disposition of a prior federal habeas petition, its legisla-
tive history, nor the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in 
the United States District Courts (hereafter Rules Govern-
ing Section 2254), support the plurality's position. Section 
2244(b), as amended in 1966, states in relevant part that a 
subsequent petition "need not be entertained . . . unless the 
application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other 
ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier applica-
tion for the writ, and unless the court . . . is satisfied that the 
applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately with-
held the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the 
writ." (Emphasis added). By its very terms, then, 
§ 2244(b) merely informs district courts that they need not 
consider successive petitions; that is, the statute gives dis-
trict courts the discretion not to hear such petitions. Simi-
larly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254, which 
were adopted in 1976, states that a "second or successive pe-
tition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege 
new or different grounds for relief and the prior determina-
tion was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are 
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to 
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse 
of the writ." (Emphasis added). 
Congress clearly intended that courts continue to deter-
mine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear 
by reference to the Sanders ends of justice standard. First, 
nothing in the House or Senate Reports accompanying the 
bill that amended § 2244 in 1966 suggests that Congress 
wished to abandon the Sanders standard. See H. R. Rep. 
No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Second, the legislative history of the 
Rules Governing Section 2254 demonstrates that in adopting 
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Rule 9(b) Congress expressly endorsed the existing case law 
governing subsequent petitions and cited Sanders. 4 H. R. 
Rep. No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976). Third, the Advisory 
Committee's Notes relating to Rule 9(b) state that Sanders 
provides the relevant standards for subsequent petitions and 
indicate that the district courts have the discretion to refuse 
to entertain vexatious and meritless subsequent petitions: 
"In Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), the 
court, in dealing with the problem of successive applica-
tions, stated: 
"'Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior 
application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only 
if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent appli-
cation was determined adversely to the applicant on the 
prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the 
merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by 
reaching the merits of the subsequent application.' 
[Emphasis added]." 
"Sanders, [28] U. S. C. § 2244, and [Rule 9(b)] make it 
clear that the court has the discretion to entertain a suc-
cessive application. 
"Subdivision (b) is consistent with the important and 
well established purpose of habeas corpus. It does not 
eliminate a remedy to which the petitioner is rightfully 
entitled. However, in Sanders, the court pointed out: 
" 'Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires 
the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litiga-
' While the discussion in the House Report regarding Rule 9(b) focuses 
on that portion of the rule that governs abuse of the writ, rather than peti-
tions that repeatedly allege the same claims, it is clear that the Committee 
intended Rule 9(b) to conform in its entirety to existing case law, particu-
larly to Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963). See H. R. Rep. 
No. 94-1471, pp. 5-6 (1976). 
10 
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tion, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only 
purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.' 373 U. S. at 18. 
" . .. In rare instances, the court may feel a need to 
entertain a petition alleging grounds that have already 
been decided on the merits. Sanders, 373 U. S. at 1, 
16. However, abusive use of the writ should be discour-
aged, and instances of abuse are frequent enough tore-
quire a means of dealing with them. For example, a 
successive application, already decided on the merits, 
may be submitted in the hope of getting before a differ-
ent judge in multijudge courts. . . . This subdivision 
is aimed at screening out the abusive petitions ... so 
that the more meritorious petitions can get quicker and 
fuller consideration." 28 U. S. C., p. 358. 
The Advisory Committee gave no indication that the prob-
lem Rule 9(b), or § 2244(b), seek to correct is that of a guilty 
prisoner seeking repeated federal review of the same con-
stitutional claim. Rather, it is apparent that the Rule at-
tempts to remedy only the problem posed by vexatious and 
meritless subsequent petitions. The Committee explicitly 
contemplated, though, that nonabusive, "meritorious [subse-
quent] petitions" would receive "full[] consideration." Ibid. 
When we review habeas cases, our task is "to give fair ef-
fect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction enacted by Congress." 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 500 (opinion of Frankfurter, 
J.). With respect to successive habeas petitions, giving "fair 
effect" to the intent of Congress is to construe "the ends of 
justice" as Sanders did-to mean that it is within the sound 
discretion of the court to refuse to hear abusive, meritless pe-
titions and to hear petitions in which the prisoner advances a 
potentially meritorious claim and provides a good justifica-
tion for returning to court a second time with the same 
claim. 5 
6 I agree with the plurality that actual innocence constitutes a sufficient 
justification for returning to court a second time with the same claim. I do 
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In the instant case, respondent alleged a potentially meri-
torious Sixth Amendment claim. He also advanced a com-
plete justification for returning to federal court a second time 
with this claim. Between his first and second federal habeas 
petitions, this Court decided United States v. Henry, 447 
U. S. 264 (1980), a case in which the facts were substantially 
similar to the facts of respondent's case 6 and in which we 
elaborated on the Sixth Amendment's prohibition against 
government interference with an accused's right to counsel, a 
prohibition that we had previously recognized in M assiah v. 
United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U. S. 387 (1977). The intervention of Henry, supra, 
clarified the appropriate analysis for Sixth Amendment 
claims like respondent's; thus the Court of Appeals did not 
abuse its discretion by granting reconsideration of respond-
ent's constitutional claim under the dispositive legal 
standard. 7 
not agree, though, that a prisoner's inability to make a showing of actual 
innocence negates an otherwise good justification, such as respondent's. 
6 The facts of this case demonstrate the arbitrariness of the Court's rule. 
The initial federal habeas petitions filed by respondent and by Henry pre-
sented virtually identical claims. Because our decision in United States v. 
Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), may have altered the law of the Circuit in 
which respondent's prior petition failed, it is only just that respondent's 
claim be reviewed under the proper constitutional standards. 
7 The plurality's factual innocence standard also presents some signifi-
cant institutional problems. First, this standard requires the federal 
courts to function in much the same capacity as the state trier of fact-the 
federal courts must make a rough decision on the question of guilt or inno-
cence. This requirement diverts the federal courts from the central pur-
pose of habeas review-the evaluation of claims that convictions were ob-
tained in violation of the Constitution. Second, it is unclear what 
relevance the plurality's standard would have in a case in which a prisoner 
alleges constitutional error in the sentencing phase of a capital case. Guilt 
or innocence is irrelevant in that context; rather, there is only a decision 
made by representatives of the community whether the prisoner shall live 
or die. Presumably, then, the plurality's test would not be applicable to 
such claims. 
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II 
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred with re-
spect to the merits of respondent's habeas petition. Accord-
ing to the Court, the Court of Appeals failed to accord 
§ 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness to the state trial 
court's findings that respondent's cellmate, Lee, "at no time 
asked any questions" of respondent concerning the pending 
charges, and that Lee only listened to respondent's "sponta-
neous" and "unsolicited" statements, App. 62-63. As a re-
sult, the Court concludes, the Court of Appeals failed to rec-
ognize that this case presents the question, reserved in 
Henry, supra, whether the Sixth Amendment forbids the ad-
mission into evidence of an accused's statements to a 
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but 
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged." Id., at 271, n. 9. I disagree with the Court's 
characterization of the Court of Appeals' treatment of the 
state court's findings and, consequently, I disagree with the 
Court that the instant case presents the "listening post" 
question. 
The state trial court simply found that Lee did not ask re-
spondent any direct questions about the crime for which re-
spondent was incarcerated. App. 62-63. The trial court 
considered the significance of this fact only under State prec-
edents, which the court interpreted to require affirmative 
"interrogation" by the informant as a prerequisite to a con-
stitutional violation. I d., at 63. The court did not indicate 
whether it referred to a Fifth Amendment or to a Sixth 
Amendment violation in identifying "interrogation" as a pre-
condition to a violation; it merely stated that "the utterances 
made by [respondent] to Lee were unsolicited, and volun-
tarily made and did not violate the defendant's Constitutional 
rights." Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals did not disregard the state court's 
finding that Lee asked respondent no direct questions re-
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garding the crime. Rather, the Court of Appeals expressly 
accepted that finding, Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F. 2d 741, 
745 (CA2 1984) ("[e]ven accepting that Lee did not ask Wil-
son any direct questions, ... "),but concluded that, as a mat-
ter of law, the deliberate elicitation standard of Henry, 
supra, and Massiah, supra, encompasses other, more subtle 
forms of stimulating incriminating admissions than overt 
questioning. The court suggested that the police deliber-
ately placed respondent in a cell that overlooked the scene of 
the crime, hoping that the view would trigger an inculpatory 
comment to respondent's cellmate. 8 The court also ob-
served that, while Lee asked respondent no questions, Lee 
nonetheless stimulated conversation concerning respondents' 
role in the Star Taxicab Garage robbery and murder by re-
marking that respondent's exculpatory story did not "'sound 
too good'" and that he had better come up with a better one. 
742 F. 2d, at 745. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the respondent's case did not present the situation reserved 
in Henry, where an accused makes an incriminating remark 
within the hearing of a jailhouse informant, who "makes no 
effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged." 
447 U. S., at 271, n. 9. Instead, the court determined this 
case to be virtually indistinguishable from Henry. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused, at least 
after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on 
counsel as the "medium" between himself and the State. 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. --, -- (1985). Accord-
ingly, the Sixth Amendment "imposes on the State an affirm-
ative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice 
to seek [the assistance of counsel]," id., at--, and there-
fore "[t]he determination whether particular action by state 
agents violates the accused's right to ... counsel must be 
made in light of this obligation." I d., at -- - --. To be 
8 The Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s soon as Wilson arrived and 
viewed the garage, he became upset and stated that "someone's messing 
with me,"' 742 F. 2d, at 745. 
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sure, the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever, "by 
luck or happenstance," the State obtains incriminating state-
ments from the accused after the right to counsel has at-
tached. It is violated, however, when "the State obtains in-
criminating statements by knowingly circumventing the 
accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation be-
tween the accused and a state agent." I d., at (footnote omit-
ted). As we explained in Henry, where the accused has not 
waived his right to counsel, the government knowingly cir-
cumvents the defendant's right to counsel where it "deliber-
ately elicit[s]" inculpatory admissions, 447 U. S., at 270, that 
is, "intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce [the ac-
cused] to make incriminating statements without the assist-
ance of counsel." Id., at 274. 
In Henry, we found that the Federal Government had "de-
liberately elicited" incriminating statements from Henry 
based on the following circumstances. The jailhouse inform-
ant, Nichols, had apparently followed instructions to obtain 
information without directly questioning Henry and without 
initiating conversations concerning the charges pending 
against Henry. We rejected the Government's argument 
that because Henry initiated the discussion of his crime, no 
Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. We pointed out 
that under M assiah, supra, it is irrelevant whether the in-
formant asks pointed questions about the crime or "merely 
engage[s] in general conversation about it." 447 U. S., at 
271-272, and n. 10. Nichols, we noted, "was not a passive 
listener; . . . he had 'some conversations with Mr. Henry' 
while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements 
were 'the product of this conversation.'" I d., at 271. 
In deciding that Nichols' role in these conversations 
amounted to deliberate elicitation, we also found three other 
factors important. First, Nichols was to be paid for any in-
formation he produced and thus had an incentive to extract 
inculpatory admissions from Henry. Id., at 270. Second, 
Henry was not aware that Nichols was acting as an inform-
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ant. Ibid. "Conversation stimulated in such circum-
stances," we observed, "may elicit information that an ac-
cused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be 
Government agents." /d., at 273. Third, Henry was incus-
tody at the time he spoke with Nichols. This last fact is sig-
nificant, we stated, because "custody imposes pressures on 
the accused [and] confinement may bring into play subtle in-
fluences that will make him particularly susceptible to the 
ploys of undercover Government agents." /d., at 274. We 
concluded that by "intentionally creating a situation likely to 
induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the 
assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel." Ibid. (footnote omitted). 
In the instant case, as in Henry, the accused was incarcer-
ated and therefore was "susceptible to the ploys of under-
cover Government agents." Ibid. Like Nichols, Lee was a 
secret informant, usually received consideration for the serv-
ices he rendered the police, and therefore had an incentive to 
produce the information which he knew the police hoped to 
obtain. Just as Nichols had done, Lee obeyed instructions 
not to question respondent and to report to the police any 
statements made by the respondent in Lee's presence about 
the crime in question. App. 62. And, like Nichols, Lee en-
couraged respondent to talk about his crime by conversing 
with him on the subject over the course of several days and 
by telling respondent that his exculpatory story would not 
convince anyone without more work. However, unlike the 
situation in Henry, a disturbing visit from respondent's 
brother, rather than a conversation with the informant, 
seems to have been the immediate catalyst for respondent's 
confession to Lee. Ante, at--; Wilson v. Henderson, 82 
Civ. 4397 (SDNY, Mar. 30, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 
25a-26a. While it might appear from this sequence of events 
that Lee's comment regarding respondent's story and his 
general willingness to converse with respondent about the 
crime were not the immediate causes of respondent's admis-
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sion, I think that the deliberate elicitation standard requires 
consideration of the entire course of government behavior. 
The State intentionally created a situation in which it was 
forseeable that respondent would make incriminating state-
ments without the assistance of counsel, Henry, supra, at 
274--it assigned respondent to a cell overlooking the scene of 
the crime and designated a secret informant to be respond-
ent's cellmate. The informant, while avoiding direct ques-
tions, nonetheless developed a relationship of cellmate cama-
raderie with respondent and encouraged him to talk about his 
crime. While the coup de grace was delivered by respond-
ent's brother, the groundwork for respondent's confession 
was laid by the State. Clearly the State's actions had a suffi-
cient nexus with respondent's admission of guilt to constitute 
deliberate elicitation within the meaning of Henry. I would 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
